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ABSTRACT

Status, Power, and Apologies: How Status and Power Shape the Willingness to
Apologize and the Perception of Victims
by
Louis Lipani

Advisor: Mary Kern

Apologies are interpersonal tools that individuals employ to repair damaged
relationships. Management scholars have largely ignored the role that power and status
play in the apology process. Across three studies I experimentally manipulate power and
status and examine the apology process via a workplace scenario. In Study 1 I propose
that power and status have different implications with respect to one’s willingness to
apologize. I orthogonally manipulate power and status and examine their effect on
people’s willingness to apologize. I find that status, but not power, impacts one’s
willingness to apologize. In Study 2 I posit and find that apologies improve victims’
perceptions of power and status-holders’ warmth, with no diminution of their dominance,
thereby enhancing their influence. In Study 3 I demonstrate that instrumentality
perceptions mediate the relationship between status and willingness to apologize. I
discuss theoretical and practical implications for the power, status, and apology domains.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

The phenomenon of a leader apologizing is both understudied by scholars and
underutilized in practice. This in spite of the fact that there is a growing body of
scholarly work on how and why people apologize, and the associated benefits (e.g. Fehr
& Gelfand, 2010; Leunissen, De Cremer, & Folmer, 2012; Tomlinson, Dineen, &
Lewicki, 2004). I contribute to this literature by considering how individuals’ status and
power, two fundamental bases of social hierarchy, influence their willingness to
apologize. There is little consensus in the literature about whether power or status, as
defined herein, makes one more or less willing to apologize. I further consider victim
perceptions of those with power and status who offer an apology following an offensive
act.
Within the power and status literatures there has been a relative lack of focus on
the consequences of power and status on interpersonal dynamics (Blader & Chen, 2012).
Researchers are just beginning to explore the differences between power and status, with
initial evidence suggesting that these factors produce opposite effects (Blader, Shirako, &
Chen, 2016). Moreover, within the apology literature the focus has been on the apology
itself, and not the relationship between the two parties in conflict (Aquino, Tripp, & Bies,
2006; Ren & Gray, 2009). These represent notable gaps in the apology, power, and
status literatures that the present research seeks to fill.
An apology has been defined in the psychology literature as a verbal or written
statement that acknowledges responsibility, remorse, and regret for a trust or rule
violation (Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, & Dirks, 2004). Apologies are an effective way for
leaders, and others with high power and/or high status, to make amends for wrongdoing
1

(Kador, 2009). We see examples of leaders apologizing for a variety of acts, from
business executives such as Jamie Dimon of JPMorgan Chase and former Target CEO
Gregg Steinhafel, to politicians such as New Jersey governor Chris Christie and then
presidential candidate Donald Trump (Ross Sorkin, 2014; Haberman, 2016). However,
these apologies – to the extent that they are seen as authentic - are made to improve
public sentiment with an eye toward one’s customer base or other important stakeholders,
for example voters (Kellerman, 2006). Moreover, apologies by public leaders are often
delivered on behalf of entire organizations and not the individuals in question.
By contrast, in this dissertation I explore the apology process in an interpersonal
context. I consider a hypothetical situation in which an individual with power and status
- or lack thereof - has offended another individual. In one set of studies, I test whether
the offender is willing to deliver a simple and sincere apology immediately following the
offensive act. In another study, I examine victim perceptions of the offender in the
aftermath of the apology. I examine these dynamics using vignettes that place
individuals in a professional setting. However, my focus is not on an act of task-related
incompetence on the part of the offender, but rather on an act of interpersonal aggression.
Moreover, the offensive act does not represent an extreme form of hostility, but
nevertheless rises to the level at which an apology is in order.
Some additional boundary conditions and assumptions are fundamental to my
inquiry. First, I do not take into account the status or power level of the victim, just that
of the offender. Second, I do not take into account the nature of the relationship between
the two parties before the offensive act. Thus, I assume that the particular aspects of this
interaction determine whether the offender is willing to apologize. And third, in my
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study of the aftermath of an apology, I assume that an apology is delivered in a simple
and sincere manner.
These boundary conditions and assumptions are limitations of my studies.
However, considering apologies in this context is necessary as jobs in the modern
workplace increasingly revolve around interpersonal interactions (Grant & Parker, 2009).
Further, people sometimes act in interpersonally offensive ways, whether intentionally or
not (Hershcovis & Barling, 2010). Indeed, instances of interpersonal aggression or
incivility, such as rudeness or publicly yelling at an interaction partner, are behaviors that
are not uncommon in the workplace (Pearson & Porath, 2009). One reason for this is
that individuals’ job demands and stress levels are frequently high. As a result, incidents
of abusive or uncivil behavior by supervisors or peers at work occur, and are a significant
problem (Andersson & Pearson, 1999; Tepper, 2007). Workplace slights in turn often
escalate into interpersonal conflict, which has deleterious consequences for both the
individuals in question and organizations as a whole (De Dreu & Weingart, 2003; de Wit,
Greer, & Jehn, 2011). Thus, it is essential for scholars and practitioners alike to
understand how interpersonal offense can be effectively managed, if not allayed.
Social scientists have consistently found that apologies are an effective way to
address conflict and repair damaged relationships (Barling, Turner, Dezan, & Carroll,
2008; Ferrin, Kim, Cooper, & Dirks, 2007). Indeed, for some types of offenses an
apology may be the only way to improve the situation between two parties (Tavuchis,
1991). This is largely because apologies play a unique and often vital role in resolving
interpersonal conflict (Darby & Schlenker, 1982). More specifically, apologies function
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as a tool that individuals can use to manage harmful conflict and mitigate the damage
from offensive actions (Fehr & Gelfand, 2010).
Nonetheless, despite the apparent benefits of issuing an apology, leaders and
others with high power or status may be reluctant to issue apologies, particularly
following a relational transgression (Hetrick, Cushenbery, Fairchild, Hunter, Shapiro, &
Shah, 2014; Lazare, 2004; Tucker, Turner, Barling, Reid, & Elving, 2006). There are
many potential reasons for this. For one, an apology represents an admission of guilt, and
those with high power and/or status may not want to accept blame for an action that is not
befitting of their hierarchical position or general social standing. Supervisors in
particular may feel as though an apology reveals weakness and undermines their
authority (Basford, Offerman, & Behrend, 2014). Indeed, the act of violating social
norms has been shown to convey power (Van Kleef, Homan, Finkenauer, Gündemir, &
Stamkou, 2011).
Further, those with power and status may feel as though it is more acceptable for
them not to apologize. For example, political pundits highlight President Trump’s
unwillingness to apologize as a core principle of his leadership style (Krugman, 2017;
McGregor, 2017). Moreover, findings suggest that apologies from high status others are
indeed more unexpected than those from low status others, one indication of their relative
infrequency in practice (Walfisch, Van Dijk, & Kark, 2013).
Nonetheless, given the potential interpersonal benefits of apologizing, it is critical
for researchers to determine whether there is something related to the nature of power
and/or status that might be hindering those who possess it from apologizing after
committing an offensive act. This is particularly important given that power and status
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considerations are pervasive in society, and most especially within organizations (Magee
& Galinsky, 2008). I have chosen to study power and status as antecedents of
willingness to apologize, rather than as moderators, because power and status have been
shown to be predictors of social factors such as the of deliverance of organizational
justice, and perspective-taking, among other related phenomena (Blader & Chen, 2012;
Blader et al., 2016).
Further, given that power and status are often jointly held, it is particularly
important for scholars to distinguish whether these constructs have similar or divergent
implications for the apology process. To this end, I hypothesize and test whether high
and low power, and high and low status, exert opposing influences on one’s willingness
to apologize. I utilize a control condition, representing a neutral state of power/status, in
order to establish a baseline from which I can determine the incremental effect of high
power, low power, high status, and low status on willingness to apologize. That is, if I
were to examine just the contrast between high versus low power, or high versus low
status - i.e. not include a control condition - I might not able to hone in on whether a
specific manipulation was increasing or diminishing willingness to apologize.

In

addition to studying the effect of status and power on willingness to apologize, I also
conduct a mediation analysis to delve into the underlying psychological mechanisms
related to apology intentions.
Turning to the aftermath of an apology, the literature is inconclusive as to the
effectiveness of apology: that is, an apology does not universally lead to positive
outcomes (Conlon & Ross, 1997; Lee, Peterson, & Tiedens, 2004; Struthers, Eaton,
Santelli, Uchiyama, & Shirvani, 2008; Zechmeister, Garcia, Romero, & Vas, 2004).
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Indeed, a host of factors may impact how an apology is received, including for example
how costly the victim sees the apology for the offender (Ohtsubo & Watanabe, 2009).
More relevant to the current research, scholars have observed that there is a dearth of
research examining the effectiveness of apologies when power is a factor (Walfisch, et
al., 2013).
Thus, we are left with many unanswered questions concerning victims’ reactions
to apologies from power and status-holders. One of the most fundamental of these is how
do victims of an interpersonal offense committed by those with high power or high status
react to an apology from the offender? I argue that it is critical to hone in on reactions to
apologies from this group of offenders since people tend to be highly cognizant of the
behavior of those with high power and/or high status (Fiske, 2010). This increased
awareness would apply to both an interpersonal offense, as well as to a subsequent
apology, or lack thereof. Further, in organizations the occurrence of injustice,
aggression, and abuse from one’s supervisor and/or others with power and status is one of
the most vexing and serious issues in the modern workplace (Aquino, Tripp, & Bies,
2006; Sutton, 2007; Tepper, 2007). As such, any intervention that might address
interpersonal offenses is of critical importance.
Addressing the reaction to apologies in a broader sense, scholars have examined a
number of outcomes, most notably victim trust in, and forgiveness toward, the offender.
While these are important outcomes for both victim and offender, it is important to
consider outcomes that are of interest to a particular class of offenders - in this case those
with high power and high status – so as to establish a motive for apologizing. To this
end, of particular concern for those with high power and high status is the degree of
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influence that they retain over others after committing an offensive act. I hold that
maintaining or enhancing one’s influence might be seen as a motive to apologize.
Finding a motive for people to apologize is important given that individuals often find it
difficult to apologize (Lazare, 2004), which may be related to a desire to avoid an
admission of guilt (Robbennolt, 2003), or to preserve one’s sense of control (Okimoto,
Wenzel, & Hedrick, 2013). Indeed, these are particularly important factors for those with
high power and/or status.
I propose that an apology after an offensive act – relative to no apology - will
enhance high power/status-holders’ level of influence. Further, I argue that this occurs
via perceptions of their warmth and dominance. Perceptions of one’s warmth and
dominance are fundamental routes to one’s level of influence (Cialdini, 1993).
Ultimately, I argue that apologies will impact these perceptions in a positive way, and as
a result, apologies might be seen as tools of influence, particularly when used in certain
contexts. Support for my argument would imply that for those in possession of high
power or high status the act of apologizing holds significant upside, with limited
downside, as it relates to one’s degree of influence over others. Concurrently this is also
expected to have a positive impact on the psychological well-being of victims, resulting
in multiple beneficiaries of this one act.
In sum, in this dissertation I develop and test a model of whether those with high
and low power, and high and low status, are willing to apologize following
interpersonally offensive acts. I further test two mediating mechanisms related to the
apology intentions of those with high/low power and high/low status. Separately, I assess
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the interpersonal impact of apologies, focusing on victim reaction toward those with high
power and high status.
I disentangle power from status to better isolate the influence of each construct,
and to provide greater explanatory power in the form of different causal paths. I draw
from a diverse set of literatures including psychology, management, sociology, and
communication to develop my hypotheses, and rely on experimental methods to test my
hypotheses.
This dissertation is organized in the following way. In Chapters Two, Three, and
Four, I provide a review of the relevant theory and findings in the status, power, and
apology literatures to develop my hypotheses. In Chapters Five, Six, and Seven, I
describe the methods that I used to test these hypotheses, and present my results. And in
Chapter Eight, I offer concluding comments and specify potential limitations and future
directions for this research.
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Chapter 2: Power, Status and the Willingness to Apologize
I draw upon and integrate three large and distinct bodies of literature within social
psychology and organizational behavior: the apology literature, the power literature, and
the status literature. First I review scholarly work relating to apologies. This includes a
general overview of apologies, as well as a summation of the studies linking apologies to
the most highly studied outcomes: trust, forgiveness, and reconciliation. Next I describe
the relatively limited theoretical and empirical work regarding individuals’ tendencies to
apologize. I then provide a summary of relevant findings in the power and status
literatures. Finally, I lay out my argument concerning how power and status impact one’s
willingness to apologize.
Apology
Overview
The act of apologizing has long drawn the attention of social scientists, many of
whom have theorized about the powerful restorative impact of apologies. Goffman’s
(1971) notion of an apology involved an admission of responsibility and regret following
a harmful act. Further, Goffman (1971) saw apologies as a means to metaphorically split
an individual into two parts, one part responsible for a wrongdoing and the other part
hoping to be forgiven. In this way an apology enables an actor to convey that an “event
should not be considered a fair representation of what [he/she] is really like as a person”
(Schlenker, 1980, p.154). The result is that the party committing the offense can be
forgiven and the parties can return to a more “normal” course of relations (Ren & Gray,
2009; Schlenker & Darby, 1981).
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The sociologist Tavuchis (1991) and the psychiatrist Lazare (2004) build upon
this notion by separately arguing that the critical components of an apology are an
expression of remorse and an admission of responsibility. Tavuchis (1991) further argues
that the power of an apology lies in the fact that even though it cannot logically undo
what has been done, that is “precisely what it manages to do” (p. 5). Lazare (2004)
echoes this sentiment: “One of the most profound human interactions is the offering and
accepting of apologies” (p. 1). A fundamental aspect of apologies is their unique ability
to repair broken relationships. For example, psychologists Chapman and Thomas (2008)
posit that when a relationship is tarnished by hurt and anger, an apology is always
necessary. Within the psychology and management literatures much of the early work on
apologies focused on the restorative impact of apologies on victim trust, and that is where
I begin my review.
Apologies and Trust
Trust violations are interpersonal transgressions that lead to a breach of trust and
a reduced level of trustworthiness for the offending party (Kim et al., 2004). Empirical
findings support the idea that apologies are effective in repairing trust in fractured
relationships. For example, Tomlinson, et al. (2004) explored both the structure and
outcomes of apologies. Most fundamentally, they showed that apologizing is superior to
not apologizing as it relates to repairing trust in a relationship. They also demonstrated
that apologies are more effective when they are: (i) perceived to be sincere; (ii) timely;
(iii) expressed in terms of “taking responsibility”; and (iv) within the context of a preexisting strong relationship. These core elements of an apology are consistent with most
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theorizing, particularly sincerity, which is often considered to be a fundamental part of an
apology (Smith, 2008).
Building on the notion that apologies are vital interpersonal tools to restore trust,
researchers delved more deeply into the contextual factors impacting apology
effectiveness. For instance, one key distinction is trust violations involving a
competence-based violation versus an integrity-based violation. The difference between
these two is that a competence-based violation relates to a work mistake of a technical
nature, whereas an integrity-based violation involves a breach that offends one’s ethical
principles (Kim et al., 2004). Addressing this difference, Kim et al. (2004) found that
apologies effectively repaired trust following competence-based violations, but not
following integrity-based violations.
Kim, Dirks, Cooper, and Ferrin (2006) added further complexity to the model by
considering the combined effect of the violation type and the attributions made during the
apology. More specifically, they varied the language in an apology such that the offender
made either an internal or external attribution for the violation. They found that after a
competence violation, trust was more successfully repaired when a party apologized with
an internal attribution; but after an integrity violation, trust was more successfully
repaired when a party apologized with an external attribution. Thus, apology
effectiveness can be seen as contextually driven.
A separate but related line of research has considered apologies following
intentional versus unintentional transgressions. Findings in this stream reveal that people
are more willing to forgive and look favorably upon offenders who apologize after
unintentional versus intentional violations (Leunissen, 2014; Struthers, et al., 2008).
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Further, Brooks, Dai, and Schweitzer (2014) found that even superfluous apologies – that
is, apologies for events that are clearly outside of one’s control - increase trust in the
apologizer. This result is consistent with prior research in the sense that a superfluous
apology essentially involves an external attribution, and in these instances apologies have
been shown to be highly effective in restoring trust. Moreover, this finding is
theoretically consistent with the findings concerning competence versus integrity-based
violations in one key way: both integrity and intentional transgressions lead to negative
dispositional judgments, which are difficult for victims to overlook.
Apologies and Forgiveness/Reconciliation
Apologies yield positive interpersonal outcomes beyond trust. Most notably,
apologies inspire forgiveness on the part of recipients towards offending parties (Fehr &
Gelfand, 2010; Andiappan & Treviño, 2011; Struthers, et al., 2008; Bachman &
Guerrero, 2006; Exline & Baumeister, 2000). This is in line with the premise that an
apology is essentially a request for forgiveness (Chapman & Thomas, 2008).
Forgiveness is desirable as it represents the internal act of foregoing anger, resentment,
and revenge against those who commit offensive actions (Aquino, et al., 2006). Thus it is
perhaps not surprising that apologies help to mitigate negative perceptions and aggressive
behavior from parties who have been injured (De Cremer & Schouten, 2008; Obhuchi,
Kameda, & Agarie, 1989).
Moreover, apologies and forgiveness are seen as important, if not required,
precursors to interpersonal reconciliation between parties. Chapman and Thomas (2008)
argue that without an apology - and the associated forgiveness - there can be no true
reconciliation between two parties in conflict and thus the relationship will inevitably
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wither. This is consistent with findings from the trust literature which suggest that when
broken, trust is difficult to restore (Kim, Dirks, & Cooper, 2009). Similarly, Tavuchis
(1991) acknowledges a natural tension between sorrow and forgiveness that occurs
between two parties: only when this tension is resolved via an apology can reconciliation
occur. Indeed, the “apology-forgiveness cycle” is theorized to be the fundamental
process wherein reconciliation takes place between parties in conflict (Shnabel & Nadler,
2008; Tavuchis, 1991). In support of this thinking, Karremans and Van Lange (2008)
found that after forgiving another party, victims were more cooperative toward their
offenders and more willing to make personal sacrifices for them.
Willingness to Apologize
Considering the large and growing body of literature on the positive effect of
apologies, it is surprising how few studies examine the willingness of the offending party
to apologize. Indeed, the vast majority of apology research to date has considered the
victim’s perspective, while virtually ignoring the perspective of the offender (e.g., Eaton,
Struthers, & Santelli, 2006; Eaton, Struthers, Shomrony, & Santelli, 2007; DeCremer,
van Dijk, & Pillutla, 2010). This is particularly noteworthy since it is the offending party
that is often expected to initiate the reconciliation process (Leunissen, 2014).
Lazare (2004) noted that in general individuals are reluctant to apologize.
Nonetheless, he argued that people may differ in their propensity to apologize. Building
on this concept, Howell, Dopko, Turowski, and Buro (2011) surveyed 940 undergraduate
students and studied the relationships between a number of psychological variables and a
newly developed Proclivity to Apologize Measure (“PAM”). The Proclivity to
Apologize construct is defined as an individual difference in the inclination to apologize
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after an interpersonal transgression. The PAM correlated positively with seeking
forgiveness (r=.17; α=.96), self-esteem (r=.24; α=.87), neuroticism (r=.29; α=.66),
agreeableness (r=.28; α=.60), compassion and other positive emotions (r=.39; α=.87),
autonomy (r=.26; α=.67), and competence (r=.22; α=.65); and correlates negatively with
self-monitoring (r=-.36; α=.62), narcissism (r=-.20; α=.84), and entitlement (r=-.15;
α=.82). Thus, the PAM is positively correlated with traits such as compassion and
autonomy that are indicative of adaptive social functioning, and negatively correlated
with traits such as entitlement and narcissism that are less adaptive socially (Howell et
al., 2011).
The PAM findings suggest that individuals may vary in their predisposition to
apologize. Lazare (2004) considers the factors that motivate people to apologize, noting
a number of individual differences that manifest into apology triggers in certain contexts.
These include (i) compassion for others; (ii) guilt and/or shame centered on a specific
incident; (iii) self-monitoring; and (iv) a desire to maintain relations and social harmony.
The latter two factors may be considered more interpersonally strategic in nature, while
the first two are internal and are related to the idea that an apology “demonstrates the
offenders’ recognition of and concern for the victims’ suffering” (Fehr & Gelfand, 2010,
p. 38). It is worth noting that while both Lazare and the PAM view compassion as a
factor that is tied to apologizing, they differ in their views of self-monitoring: Lazare
asserts that it is positively linked to apologizing, and the PAM finds that it is negatively
linked.
Tangney and colleagues (e.g. Tangney, Youman, & Steuwig, 2009) further
explore the psyche of the offender, arguing for the primacy of guilt as a trigger of
14

empathy first and then apologies. Building on the fundamental role of guilt in the
apology process, Leunissen, De Cremer, Folmer, and van Dijke (2013) contrast the
psychological needs of offender and offended, and find that offenders prefer to offer
apologies after unintentional and not intentional transgressions. They argue that this is
because offenders’ guilt and empathy is stronger following unintended misdeeds because
offenders don’t have the opportunity to rationalize their bad behavior beforehand.
Scholars have also assessed the reasons why individuals are reluctant to
apologize, though these generally represent theoretical arguments that have yet to be
tested empirically. Tavuchis (1991) argued that in order to apologize individuals must
overcome a natural disinclination to do so, related to individuals’ fear of rejection.
Indeed, an apology is seen as tantamount to surrendering power to the victim (Leunissen,
2014). This is consistent with the notion that one needs courage to apologize (Lazare,
2004), due in part to the fact that following an apology one runs the risk of losing face or
otherwise making a bad situation worse (Kellogg, 2007).
Lazare (2004) expands upon this rationale by contending that individuals are
averse to apologizing for a myriad of reasons, including: (i) a fear of the reaction of the
other party; (ii) embarrassment and the idea that an apology makes one appear weak; (iii)
a lack of awareness that the other party is offended; and (iv) a lack of efficacy
surrounding the act of apologizing. Chapman and Thomas (2008) weigh in with a slightly
different take, advancing the notion that people refuse to apologize because (i) they don’t
believe it’s worth the effort; (ii) they believe the other party was at fault; and (iii) they
have low self-esteem. Underscoring some of the points above, it is logical to assume that
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some offenders may see their behavior as justified and thus not meriting an apology
(Leunissen, 2014).
The arguments outlined above represent a window into the psyche of a would-be
– and generally reluctant - apologizer. Moreover, at least one article empirically
demonstrated that refusing to apologize may be beneficial to one’s psyche, thereby
perhaps justifying our reluctance to apologize. Across two studies, Okimoto, et al.
(2013) considered whether refusing to apologize is positively associated with a sense of
power, value integrity, and self-esteem. In the first study, participants were asked to
recall an instance in which they either refused to apologize, offered an apology, or took
no apologetic action: the researchers then measured how participants felt about
themselves after the situation. In the second study, participants were asked to recall an
instance in which they had offended someone; the researchers then manipulated whether
participants apologized or not, after which participants were asked how they felt about
themselves.
In both studies participants who refused to apologize reported greater
power/control and value integrity; in addition, these mediated the relationship between
refusal to apologize and greater self-esteem (Okimoto et al., 2013). Refusing to apologize
is thus seen as a way to feel more empowered, and an individual’s refusal to apologize
might be motivated by basic human needs for autonomy and consistency (Okimoto et al.,
2013). It is interesting to consider these findings relative to the previously mentioned
PAM study, which in a similar vein suggested that one’s tendency to apologize is
positively related to one’s self-esteem and autonomy. One potential implication is that -
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consciously or not - those with self-esteem or autonomy concerns may not want to
exacerbate these concerns by apologizing.
Notwithstanding theoretical arguments concerning one’s willingness or
unwillingness to apologize, there is a notable lack of empirical support for these
contentions, with few exceptions. A paper by Exline, Deshea, and Holeman (2007) is
one of the few to introduce and test a framework of situational factors predicting
apologies, drawing from the justice literature to propose a set of conditions under which
individuals are likely to apologize. Building on the arguments of Lazare, among others,
Exline and colleagues suggest that there are two broad categories that compel offenders
to apologize to victims: (i) these offenders see themselves as clearly responsible for an
injustice; and/or (ii) they view their pre-existing relationship with victims as closer or
more committed than do those who don’t apologize. Exline et al. showed in a withinsubject design that apologies were indeed more likely in situations in which the offender
felt genuine remorse, and in which the offender felt closer to the victim. Moreover, in
response to open-ended questions concerning apology motives, the two most common
responses were a desire to help the other person or the relationship (51% of respondents),
and a desire to relieve guilt (39%).
The two broad apology criteria established by Exline and colleagues, which are
consistent with earlier theorizing by Lazare and Tavuchis – offenders’ relational concerns
and feelings of remorse - serve as the general foundation for my hypotheses concerning
apologies, power, and status. More specifically, I argue that the possession of high or
low power or status will help drive one’s willingness to apologize.
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Power and Status
The theoretical support for making divergent predictions about how those with
power or status might behave in certain situations is rooted in social psychology. There
have been important conceptual refinements in the power and status literature over the
last 20 years, including the notion that power and status are theoretically distinct
constructs (e.g. Fiske, 1993; Fragale, Overbeck, & Neale, 2011; Keltner, Gruenfeld,
Anderson, 2003). Indeed, scholars are beginning to parse out the differing psychological
effects of status and power (Blader & Chen, 2012; Blader et al., 2016; Magee &
Galinsky, 2008). I will draw on these perspectives in the conceptualizations of power
and status that follow.
Power is defined as control over critical resources and valued outcomes within a
set of social relations (Fiske, 1993; Keltner et al., 2003; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). More
specifically, power typically entails the control over money, information, or decisionmaking (Anderson, John, & Keltner, 2012; French & Raven, 1959). By contrast, status is
conceptualized as the prestige, respect, admiration, and esteem that a party has in the eyes
of others (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009; Fiske, 2010; Fragale, et al., 2011; Magee &
Galinksy, 2008). I chose these definitions of power and status because they represent the
current consensus within the psychology and management fields, particularly regarding
those studies which seek to disentangle the effects of power and status. Importantly, as
defined in this literature, hierarchical position or ranking is not a necessary condition of
either power or status, though in practice it frequently goes hand in hand with one or both
of these factors. Moreover, while I define power in terms of extrinsic resources, it also
could also derive from intrinsic, internalized sources (Anderson et al., 2012).
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One critical distinction between power and status that is highly relevant to my
argument is that status is conferred via the judgments and evaluations of others, while
power is considered more a property of the individual actor in a given context, and is thus
less reliant on external judgments (Magee & Galinksy, 2008; Blader & Chen, 2012).
This fundamental contrast has significant implications for individuals’ motivation and
behavior including, I argue, their willingness to apologize.
In the sections below I review extant theory concerning power and status. I
organize my review around high and low dichotomies of power and status because I
make hypotheses about the willingness to apologize on this basis. The reason why I
dichotomize what is a continuous variable by nature is that I consider this a reasonable
simplification, taking into account the relatively limited amount of research on the topic.
As researchers consider the different effects of power and status, the field has largely
structured the inquiry around these two groupings, high and low; this practice is
normative in the field (e.g. Blader & Chen, 2012; Blader et al., 2016). I further argue that
in practice individuals place interaction partners into these high and low buckets in order
to determine how to approach these partners. Moreover, I think that these groupings are
even more applicable to my study because I don’t consider a history between the two
parties: In this context, I argue that one is even more likely to place oneself or another
person into a binary group as a simplifying assumption.
High Power
The power-as-control theory (Fiske, 1993), and the approach/inhibition theory of
power (Keltner, et al., 2003), provide a theoretical foundation for making predictions
concerning how power impacts one’s willingness to apologize. According to these
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theories, those with relatively high power experience fewer social/normative constraints
and exhibit tendencies of an activated approach system, including more automatic
information processing and less inhibited behavior (Fiske, 1993; Keltner, et al., 2003).
Further, high power individuals are able to block out peripheral information and focus on
task relevant information (Guinote, 2007).
As it relates to the automaticity of social cognition, Keltner et al. (2003) propose
that high power individuals “should tend to judge others’ attitudes, interests, and
positions less accurately” (p. 273). This is largely because high power individuals
engage in more heuristic assessments of others (Keltner et al., 2003). This builds upon
basic tenets in power-as-control theory, which suggests that those with power are
unmotivated to pay attention to those without power (Fiske, 1993). Relatedly, it has been
experimentally shown that high power individuals are poorer judges of others’ emotions
than are low power individuals (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, &
Gruenfeld, 2006), and engage in less perspective taking (Blader et al., 2016).
Further, higher-power individuals – after learning of another’s suffering experience less reciprocal emotion (i.e. distress) and less complementary emotion (i.e.
compassion) than lower-power individuals (van Kleef, Oveis, van der Lowe, LuoKogan,
Goetz, & Keltner, 2008). Evidence suggests that these social interaction effects may be
related to brain function. Indeed, Hogeveen, Inzlicht, and Obhi (2014) found that those
primed with high power demonstrated lower levels of motor resonance – a neural
mechanism in which one’s brain activity mirrors that of another person - than those with
low power. Thus, there could in fact be a neurological underpinning to the tendency of
those with high power to neglect the powerless (Hogeveen et al., 2014).
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Relative to my argument, the above are factors that could tie into one’s proclivity
to apologize or not. For one, the preceding logic can be linked to the baseline premise
that in order to apologize one must feel guilty for an offensive act (Exline et al., 2007).
Those with high power may not feel as responsible for an offensive act because they are
less cognizant of the negative implications for the victim; they are also less likely to be
aware of or feel compassion toward the victim (van Kleef et al., 2008). Indeed, Kim et
al. (2009) argue that one of the fundamental complications in trust repair is the fact that
the offender often does not realize that trust has been violated.
Moreover, power has been shown to foster self-interested behavior and moral
hypocrisy, in which individuals place strict moral standards on other people yet engage in
less strict behavior themselves (Galinsky et al., 2006; Lammers, Stapel, & Galinsky,
2010). Relatedly, those with high power experience less social pressure with regard to
the attitudes that they form (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). The result is that those with high
power are more likely to feel justified in their behavior, to consider the other party at
fault, and to be emotionally detached, making these individuals less willing to apologize.
Further, the second pillar of apologizing – the existence of a closer, more
committed relationship –provides an additional basis for the argument that those with
high power are less willing to apologize. This is because power creates social distance
and with it the tendency to stereotype and objectify others, and to treat them
instrumentally (Fiske, 1993; Gruenfeld, Inesi, Magee, & Galinsky, 2008; Magee &
Smith, 2013). For instance, Kipnis (1972) showed that those with greater power create
psychological distance between themselves and those with less power, and tend to view
these individuals as objects of manipulation. In interpreting these results, he contends
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that those with greater power will struggle to maintain ‘close and friendly relations’ with
those with lesser power (Kipnis, 1972). Magee and Smith (2013) further theorize that
because those with high power are less dependent on the views and actions of those with
less power, this reduces their motivation to affiliate with these individuals.
From a relational perspective, those with high power seemingly have more
discretion concerning whether to apologize or not because the source of their power is not
rooted in their relationship with others. Thus they may feel less inclined to invest
emotional energy in apologizing in order to demonstrate their commitment to a
relationship. Relatedly, those with high power possess a freedom from social norms,
which creates flexibility in terms of how the powerful approach social situations (Blader
& Chen, 2012). One example of this phenomenon is the fact that high power is
negatively associated with procedural and distributive justice exhibited towards others
(Blader & Chen, 2012). This tendency of those with high power to bypass the basic
social norm of exhibiting fairness towards others is indicative of how those with high
power view social obligations.
A final point concerning the likelihood of one with high power apologizing is the
idea that an apology itself entails proclaiming one’s helplessness and putting oneself at
the mercy of another party (Tavuchis, 1991). Indeed, Lazare (1995, p. 42) proffers:
"What makes an apology work is the exchange of shame and power between the offender
and the offended." An apology thus represents a relinquishment of power by one
individual to another, placing the other party in a more dominant role (Schneider, 2000;
Exline et al., 2007). Within the context of the dyadic relationship, the victim - and
recipient of the apology - has temporarily taken control of decision-making. That is, the
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recipient of the apology has the power to decide whether or not to accept the apology:
this is a level of vulnerability that those with high power might seek to avoid. Indeed,
Exline and Baumeister (2001) argue that a fear of apologizing and the associated
vulnerability should be especially salient for offenders who desire to maintain dominance
within a relationship. Taken as a whole these arguments suggest that those with high
power will be less inclined to apologize than those in an experimental control condition.
Hypothesis 1: Individuals with high power will be less willing to apologize (vs.
control).
Low Power
For those with low power the world is a vastly different, and potentially perilous,
place due to their lack of control over valued outcomes (Fiske, 2010). One result is that
those with low power have a heightened sensitivity to threat and punishment (Keltner et
al., 2003). This supports the idea that those with low power will be more willing to
apologize, in an attempt to avoid punishment for a negative act. Moreover, one
implication of a relative lack of control is that low-power individuals will be more
influenced by situational demands (Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld, Whitson, & Liljenquist,
2008). In addition, individuals with low power will feel less autonomy due to their
relative paucity of resources (Fiske, 1993).
These fundamental aspects of low power, (i) situational predominance, and (ii)
lack of autonomy, suggest that those with low power will be more willing to apologize.
First, the act of apologizing after committing an interpersonal offense is considered a
normative response to resolve a conflict (Tavuchis, 1991).

Second, those without a

sense of autonomy are expected to apologize more (Tavuchis, 1991).
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In addition, I expect that those with low power will be more likely to recognize
that an apology is required. For one, those with low power are more likely to engage in
perspective taking (Galinsky et al., 2006). In one demonstration of this idea, those
primed with low power (vs. high power) were better able to adopt another person’s
perspective (Galinsky et al., 2006). This perspective-taking effect can also lead to
misjudgments: for example, low-power individuals tend to overestimate negative
emotions in their supervisors relative to the emotions that these individuals actually felt
(Anderson & Berdahl, 2002). Thus, those with low power are more likely to take the
victim’s point of view and recognize that this person requires an apology. Indeed, the
low power person is more likely to apologize for even minor issues because he/she might
perceive victims to be more upset than they really are.
In addition, those with low power are expected to undergo more complex
reasoning in assessing their social relations, and to assume a more strategic posture
(Keltner et al., 2003). In this sense, low power-holders should be more committed to
preserving their existing relationships because of their relative dependency on other
individuals. Supportive of this notion, those with low power must often inhibit their
desires in order to avoid negative consequences (Keltner et al., 2003). Taking this factor
into account, there is a greater likelihood that those with low power will apologize simply
to placate an aggrieved party.
Hypothesis 2: Individuals with low power will be more willing to apologize (vs.
control).
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High Status
With regard to status, status maintenance concerns focus one’s attention outward
to social entities (Flynn, Reagans, Amanatullah, & Ames, 2006). This is because status is
necessarily conferred by others via social processes (Blau, 1964). Indeed, status by
definition cannot be held unless targets willingly choose to grant it (Fragale et al., 2011).
Thus status, unlike power, is a property not so much of the individual actor but of
observers (Magee & Galinksy, 2008). I argue that because status is derived through our
relationships with others, it will affect one’s inclination to apologize, particularly since
apologies are delivered in order to influence how others perceive and behave towards us
(Lazare, 2004).
There are prior studies that address the relationship between status and
apologizing; however either the findings were inconclusive, or the operationalization of
status was more closely related to our current conceptualization of power. To wit,
Holmes (1990) considered apologies and status but operationalized status as the extent to
which one can impose his/her plans on others, which is more akin to power as I’ve
defined it. In a sample of apologies, Holmes (1990) found that while offenders of equal
status with victims most often delivered apologies (63% of the time), offenders with
lower status than victims delivered almost twice as many apologies upward (23.5%) as
offenders with higher status delivered downward (13.1%).
Gonzales, Pederson, Manning, and Wetter (1990) also studied the link between
status and apologies. The theoretical underpinning for their hypothesizing was Brown and
Levinson’s politeness theory (1978), which suggests that those of lower status will tend
to be more polite to higher status victims. These authors found that there was no effect of
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status on the use of apologies. However there are several important differences between
this study and my dissertation. In the Gonzales study, status was operationalized as
hierarchical status, which relates to one’s ranking within a social setting. Moreover, this
study was focused on the broader concept of accounts, which are verbal explanations of
misbehavior that include not only apologies but also concessions, excuses, justifications,
and refusals (Gonzales et al., 1990).
Further, in a vignette study involving an instance of a broken promise at work,
Takaku (2000) found that status – operationalized as hierarchical rank - did not influence
Americans’ views on the appropriateness of an apology versus a justification. This view
was in contrast to that of Japanese participants, who felt that an apology was more
appropriate than a justification when a lower status individual breaks a promise to a
higher status individual, as compared to when a higher status individual breaks a promise.
Returning to my argument, in order to achieve and maintain status one must be
pleasing in the eyes of external parties. Social groups convey status to an individual
based on attributions that members make about that individual (Hogg, 2001). The
individual with high status is perceived not only to possess superior skills and abilities,
but also the willingness to use these talents to benefit the group (Fragale et al., 2011). In
this way, high status carries with it expectations concerning appropriate behavior, to the
extent that those with high status are seen as having responsibility for those around them
(Fiske, 1992). Magee and Galinsky (2008, p. 360), in reviewing prior status literature,
assert that “status emerges from expectations that individuals have for their own and each
other’s performance.”
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Consistent with this premise, Blader and Chen (2012) argue that high status
individuals will be highly attuned to the impressions that others form of them, and will
thus be motivated to behave in a respectable manner. An apology would appear to fall
into this category of respectable behavior (Tedeschi & Norman, 1985). Indeed, Tedeschi
and Norman (1985) classify an apology as “defensive-tactical” impression management
behavior, intended to repair damaged identities. Hogan and Emler (1981) theorize that
those with high status must be careful not to give “gratuitous public offense”. I submit
that one way to avoid offending is to apologize after a questionable act.
Moreover, one of the ways that individuals who want greater status can attain it is
through displays of generosity and selflessness (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009).
Additionally, Blader and Chen (2012) found that psychological status was positively
associated with exhibiting procedural and distributive justice towards others. These
findings all support the idea that those with high status tend to behave in positive ways in
order to manage the social judgments that others form of them. Thus, I expect that a high
status offender will consider issuing an apology in order to repair the damaged
impression that a victim has of him/her.
Perhaps even more relevant to my argument, Blader et al. (2016) theorized and
found that high status enhances perspective taking. This directly ties into one’s
willingness to apologize in that by considering another person’s perspective, one is more
likely to recognize that this party has been offended by one’s actions. This in turn makes
one more likely to feel responsible for a negative act, and thus ultimately more willing to
apologize (Exline et al., 2007).
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The second big theoretical driver of apologies – the existence of a closer, more
committed relationship – is also supportive of the idea that high status individuals will be
more willing to apologize. Individuals with high status should be generally committed
to their existing relationships because these relationships are the source of their status in
the first place. Moreover, individuals with high status are more prone to see their
existing relationships in a positive light. Indeed, Lount and Pettit (2012) argue that high
status triggers an expectation that others will have favorable motives and exhibit positive
behaviors towards them. These researchers found that high status led people to initially
trust others more, and this was mediated by a belief that others have positive intentions
toward them (Lount & Pettit 2012).
Similarly, Pettit and Sivanathan (2012) argue that high status arouses a set of
expectations around the social rewards (e.g. displays of respect, approval, appreciation,
and praise) that those with high status will receive due to their elevated position.
Supportive of this contention, Pettit and Sivanathan (2012) experimentally found that
those in high status positions reported hearing applause as louder and seeing facial
expressions as more favorable. Moreover, this effect was mediated by expectations of
how others would respond: that is those with high status had higher expectations of how
the audience would respond (e.g. I expect to hear applause, rated on a seven-point scale)
than those with low status.
One takeaway from these two studies is that those with high status are more likely
to feel confident in how others will respond to them. As it relates to the apology process,
I suggest that high status individuals are more likely to expect that their apology will be
accepted, and by extension to worry less that their apology will be rejected. This is
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important as the prospect of rejection is a key deterrent for apologizing (Lazare, 2004).
Indeed, the instrumental perspective on apologies suggests that individuals are more
likely to apologize when they believe that they will be forgiven by the victim (Exline et
al., 2007; Leunissen et al., 2012).
A final argument for why those with high status are more likely to apologize is
that they are loathe to lose the public standing that they possess, and will expend
considerable effort to maintain this standing, including presumably the delivery of an
apology. Pettit, Yong, and Spataro (2010), building on classic work on gain/loss frames
(e.g. Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) found that individuals attach greater value to status
when recalling the risk of status loss than when recalling the potential for status gain.
Further, individuals are willing to pay more to avoid a status loss than to achieve a status
gain, and put forth greater effort when striving to prevent status loss than when striving to
gain status. As previously argued, apologizing often requires considerable psychic pain
and effort. Nonetheless, assuming that individuals see apologies as a status-maintenance
act, these findings suggest that high status individuals are likely to apologize in order to
preserve their privileged social standing.
It is important to note that idiosyncratic credit theory (Hollander, 1958) suggests
that those with high status may be less willing to apologize. This theory holds that those
with high status can behave in certain unexpected ways once they are established within a
group and not lose standing: essentially high status holders accrue social credits that can
then be depleted if the person with high status behaves in a peculiar manner (Hollander,
1958). Thus, according to this theory, a high status individual can presumably afford not
to apologize after certain actions and instead rely on accumulated social credits.
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However, I argue that an apology can be a quick and effective way for the high
status holder to replenish the idiosyncratic credit account that was depleted by the
original offensive act. As such, I suggest that high status holders might be inclined to
take advantage of this opportunity to rebuild the account, particularly if it has been
cumulatively diminished by other actions. In this way my hypothesis concerning high
status and apologies is not wholly inconsistent with idiosyncratic theory. At the same
time, it is likely that high status holders will not be compelled to apologize for all
offenses. Perhaps high status individuals will apologize only in those instances in which
they believe the apology will materially boost their idiosyncratic credit account.
In sum, for all of these reasons I argue that those with high status will be more
inclined to apologize than those in a control condition.
Hypothesis 3: Individuals with high status will be more willing to apologize (vs.
control).
Low Status
By contrast, there are both instrumental and relational reasons why those with low
status might be less willing to apologize. I make this contention despite the fact that one
could also argue that low status individuals may feel some sort of obligation to apologize
out of deference, particularly in a context in which they are interacting with high status
people. For one, individuals with low status have reason to be skeptical about the quality
of their interpersonal ties, as their peers generally view them with less respect and
admiration (Blader & Chen, 2012). As a result, they cannot be confident that their
apologies will be accepted, an important precondition to apologizing (Leunissen et al.,
2012). Indeed, for individuals with low status, accepting responsibility for a negative act
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may in fact confirm to others that they are not trustworthy, which may in turn impair their
ability to gain status in the future. Thus the implication for those with low status is that
the act of apologizing - which even in the best of cases carries social risk - is even riskier
for them compared to those with higher status.
Further, for those with low status, relationships tend to be less consensual
(Fragale et al., 2011). As a result, low status individuals are likely to feel a lack of
relational commitment from their social counterparts. This is because those with low
status are aware that they are not as respected or viewed as favorably as others
(Anderson, Srivastava, Beer, Spataro, & Chatman, 2006). Principles of reciprocity and
social exchange suggest that those who experience a lack of commitment from others will
feel less committed in return (Cialdini, 1993). This is a problem as relational
commitment is a significant factor in compelling individuals to overcome the natural
tendency not to apologize (Leunissen, 2014). As a result, those with low status should be
less willing to apologize.
Behavioral confirmation theory (Snyder, Tanke, & Berscheid, 1977) buttresses
the prediction that those with low status will be less willing to apologize. This theory
holds that people will tend to behave in ways that conform to the views that others have
of them (Snyder, et al., 1977). As it relates to my argument, individuals with low status
in a particular social context would be expected to behave less admirably within this
context by those around them. Low status individuals are more likely to feel that an
interpersonal transgression on their part is expected by the group, and as a result might
conform to this expectation and behave in such a negative manner. Further, not
apologizing may be consistent with the expected behavior of those with lower status,
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because a sincere apology is an act of strong moral character and integrity. This in turn
should make individuals with low status less willing to apologize.
Hypothesis 4: Individuals with low status will be less willing to apologize (vs.
control).
Interaction of High/Low Power and High/Low Status
I have argued that high power and low status, respectively, will tend to make
individuals less willing to apologize, while low power and high status, respectively, will
tend to make individuals more willing to apologize. But it is important to also consider
the interaction of these variables, as there are many roles in society in which individuals
possess some combination of these factors. For example, IRS agents are generally
considered to have high power but low status, while social workers frequently have high
status but low power. Moreover, there is surprisingly little work on the interaction of
these two variables, as some researchers have noted (Fast, Halevy, & Galinsky, 2012).
My core premise is that status exerts a greater impact than power in the apology
process. The support for this contention rests on the fundamental tenets of image
restoration theory (Benoit, 1995), and the notion that the maintenance of one’s image in a
social context is paramount. Image restoration theory is concerned with the strategies
that both personal and organizational offenders can employ in order to restore their image
or reputation after committing an offensive act. The theory rests on two assumptions.
The first is that communication is a goal directed activity. Actors will consider salient
goals and issue communication in furtherance of these goals, assuming that the cost of
this communication is reasonable (Benoit, 1995). Communication is thus seen as an
instrumental act.
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The second assumption is that a key consideration in communication is to
maintain and repair one’s reputation (Benoit, 1995). Reputation has been defined as the
set of beliefs, perceptions, and evaluations that a group forms about an individual
member (Anderson & Shirako, 2008). In this way the theory builds upon Goffman’s
(1967) contention that individuals will strive to preserve their face, particularly if it is
threatened. Benoit (1995) further argues that people are concerned with their reputation
for two principal reasons. First, one’s reputation is linked to one’s self-image; second,
one’s reputation is critical to the degree of influence that one possesses (Benoit, 1995).
This is because a positive reputation within one’s community results in greater status in
that community (Anderson & Shirako, 2008).
One implication of this theory is that when one’s positive reputation is threatened
– as it would be after an offensive act - one will be compelled to take action to restore
this reputation. This assumes that the offender is aware that he/she has offended. One of
the prescribed actions, according to the theory, is an apology. This is consistent with
Lazare’s (2004) argument that offenders often apologize in order to maintain social
support. Thus, a high status offender, when facing a situation in which he/she has
committed an offensive act, would be primarily concerned with preserving his/her
reputation in order to maintain a high status level. Moreover, in this situation one’s level
of power should not be of paramount importance since power – as defined herein - will
not be impacted by the issuance or non-issuance of the apology.
An additional argument for the dominance of status over power is the idea that
status is the more socially fluid construct. This is because status hinges on the views of
others, and is thus liable to be modified. By contrast, power - as I have defined it here -
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is more fixed and less subject to change. As a result, status concerns would be more
prominent in one’s mind given that there is a greater opportunity for status to be altered,
even for those with high power who are less reliant on others.
Given these arguments concerning high status, combined with my earlier ones
regarding low power, individuals possessing both of these factors should be most inclined
to apologize. However, for those who possess both high status and high power, I have
argued for opposing inclinations. Nonetheless, one of the implications of high power is
the more effective pursuit of goals (Guinote, 2007). Since my argument centers on the
idea that a key goal of high status individuals is to maintain their status level, those with
high status and high power should be more willing to apologize because it is in keeping
with their overarching goal of preserving high status. Thus individuals with both high
status and high power should be more willing to apologize.
In sum, with respect to this interaction, I argue that one’s status will be a more
impactful factor than one’s power in determining whether one tends to apologize after a
transgression. That is to say, under conditions of high status I predict that individuals
will be more willing to apologize than those in a control condition, regardless of their
level of power. Conversely, under conditions of low status, individuals will be less
willing to apologize, again regardless of their level of power.
Hypothesis 5: Individuals with high status will be more willing to apologize (vs.
control), regardless of whether they have high power, low power, or control power.
In the case of low status offenders, their status is impaired even before
committing the offensive act. As a result, there is less incentive to issue an apology for
face restoration reasons. This is because an apology for a single negative act, while
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expected to have a positive impact on one’s social standing, presumably cannot transform
a low status individual into a high status one. This is in line with my earlier argument
about the negative association between low status and apologies.
Thus, I expect those with low status and high power to be the least willing to
apologize. For those with low status and low power, an argument can be made on both
sides. Indeed, I have hypothesized that low power will increase one’s willingness to
apologize because low power individuals are better at perspective taking and are more
strategic in their social interactions. Nonetheless, I predict that the possession of low
status will override these tendencies as it relates to apologies. To support this premise, I
return to my general argument about low status individuals and apologies: because these
individuals have less to gain from an apology, and because they can have less confidence
that their apology will be accepted, they are less likely to bear the interpersonal costs and
risks of issuing one.
Hypothesis 6: Individuals with low status will be less willing to apologize (vs.
control), regardless of whether they have high power, low power, or control power.
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Chapter 3: Apologies and Perceived Dominance and Warmth
Apologies, Power, Status, and Influence
Thus far I have argued that power and status exert varying intrapersonal influence
on the apology process. It is also important to consider the interpersonal impact of power
and status as it relates to apologies. To reiterate, I define power as control over critical
resources and valued outcomes; and I define status as the prestige, respect, admiration,
and esteem that one possesses from others (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). Power is thus
derived independently from the social judgments of others, while status derives directly
from these social judgments.
Despite the substantial differences between power and status that I have
enumerated in the previous chapter, there is one fundamental similarity: both power and
status are routes to potential influence over others (French & Raven, 1959; Magee &
Galinsky, 2008). In other words, people are more likely to follow the directives of an
individual who either controls valued resources or who they highly regard (Fragale et al.,
2011). Power, status, and influence are thus inexorably linked. Due to this fact, as well
as to the general importance of influence in social and organizational settings, I will focus
my inquiry on the impact that an apology has on one’s degree of social influence.
The distinction between power and status - and the distinction between these two
constructs and influence - is fundamental to my hypothesizing. Power and status have
often been thought of in terms of capability to influence; that is, these constructs were
defined and measured based on how much influence one possessed. However, Magee
and Galinsky (2008) hold that while influence has traditionally been considered a
dimension of both power and status, it is in fact a downstream effect of power and status.
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Thus influence is a dependent variable in this conceptualization: the possession of power
and/or status shapes one’s capacity to influence others. In this way power, status, and
influence are conceptually distinct (Magee & Galinsky, 2008).
Social influence is an important concern for humans, going back to our ancestors
who utilized influence tactics for reasons of survival and reproduction (Sundie, Cialdini,
Griskevicius, & Kenrick, 2012). Indeed, a core social motive for humans is a desire to
maximize one’s ability to influence others (Tedeschi & Norman, 1985). It is thus
understandable why those with high power or high status would seek to maintain their
social influence, particularly after committing an offensive act that might serve to
alienate others and chip away at one’s influence. From a research perspective, my
objective is to hone in on how apologies impact the influence process with the two
groups that typically harbor the most interpersonal influence, those with high power
and/or high status.
I approach this study of apologies and the influence process via an examination of
the social judgments that others hold of those with high power and high status following
an apology. While high power and high status both impact one’s degree of influence, they
may elicit different social judgments that in turn impact the influence process (Fragale et
al., 2011). I focus on perceptions of one’s warmth and dominance. These social
judgments are conceptually distinct from high power and high status, despite the fact that
status itself is a form of social judgment. Nonetheless these constructs are linked because
the possession of high power and/or high status helps to shape warmth and dominance
impressions, as I will explain in the sections that follow. But first I will provide an
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overview of the theoretical support for the idea that an apology can ultimately shape
one’s level of influence.
The Elaboration Likelihood Model and Influence
My argument is centered on the notion that apologies from high status or high
power individuals help to shape their interpersonal influence following an offensive act.
Further, I argue that this occurs via the social judgments that others make about these
individuals after they apologize. It is important to embed my model into a contextual
theory of influence. Several theories address the influence process, and one of the most
prominent of these is the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM). The ELM is applicable
to my argument in that it helps explain how social judgments made by a target about
another individual can lead to increased influence for that individual.
The ELM, developed by Petty and Cacioppo (1986) as a comprehensive theory
encompassing many prior persuasion theories and frameworks, addresses the cognitive
processes that occur within targets of influence. The ELM reflects a dual system
approach to judgment, and holds that there are two routes to influence, the central route
and the peripheral route (Petty & Brinol, 2012). The central, or elaborated, route is the
more cognitively sophisticated of the two, and involves a target’s rational processing of
information, arguments, and evidence (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). In order for the target
to be changed or persuaded, the target must be both motivated and capable of
understanding the information presented.
By contrast, the peripheral - or low route - involves persuasion at a more
emotional level. Within the context of the peripheral route, attitudes can be shaped by
simple heuristics (Petty & Brinol, 2015). These heuristics involve relatively quick
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perceptions on the part of the target. My model concerning the aftermath of an apology
is best understood within the context of this peripheral route, although an apology can
certainly lead to higher levels of cognitive processing by the target as well.
Importantly for my hypothesizing, the ELM holds that source variables fall under
the auspices of peripheral cues. These source factors are aspects of the individual who
delivers the message, as perceived by the target (Petty & Brinol, 2015). Two of these
source factors are directly related to my model. The first of these is the target’s
perception of the source’s authority (Cialdini, 1994; Petty & Brinol, 2015). The
implication is that more the source is viewed as powerful or authoritative, the more
influence this person will possess. This notion of authority is directly tied to the
perception of dominance that I have chosen to study. The second peripheral cue relevant
for my argument is whether one is liked by a target: the more one is liked, the more
influence he/she will possess (Cialdini, 1994; Petty & Brinol, 2015). Likeability is
related to warmth, which is the second social judgment that I study.
Thus, the ELM provides broad theoretical support for my contention that the
social judgments that the victim makes about the offending party will result in that party
having more influence following an apology. More specifically, warmth and dominance
perceptions act as peripheral cues in the influence process. I will now provide a more
detailed description of the social judgments dominance and warmth, and present my
argument concerning how apologies from high status/high power individuals impact
these social judgments.
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Social Judgments: Warmth and Dominance
Social judgments are made as individuals engage in social learning, which
involves obtaining information about and making assessments of others (Lee & Harris,
2014). Social judgments involve the characteristics that others attribute to a party, and
the study and categorization of these trait attributions has a long history in social
psychology (Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2006). Fundamentally all individuals, upon
encountering others in their environment, must determine the intentions and capabilities
of these other parties (Fiske, et al., 2006). This person perception process is often
spontaneous, and has been shown to have a neurological basis (Fiske & Taylor, 2013;
Lee & Harris, 2014). Further, the impressions that people form about others greatly
shape the nature of their interactions with others (Fragale et al., 2011).
Consistent with the ELM, the social judgments that others make about us helps to
determine our degree of influence. Two social judgments that directly relate to one’s
influence are others’ perceptions of one’s warmth, and their perceptions of one’s
dominance (Cialdini, 1993). The warmth dimension refers to the perception of one’s
positive intentions towards others, and encapsulates traits including friendliness,
helpfulness, sincerity, trustworthiness, and morality (Fiske et al., 2006; Fragale et al.,
2011). By contrast dominance is traditionally seen as the perception of one’s tendency to
behave in a self-assured manner, and captures traits including ambition, assertiveness,
decisiveness, and forcefulness, among others (Abele & Wojciszke, 2014; Anderson &
Kilduff, 2009; Fragale et al., 2011). Warmth is considered the primary social judgment
because it is the first judgment that people make, and it accounts for the most variance in
trait ratings (Fiske et al., 2006; Abele & Wojciszke, 2007). Moreover, the primacy of
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warmth can be seen in evolutionary terms as a key to survival is to first determine another
party’s intentions before assessing their capabilities.
Warmth is deemed by scholars to be one of the two fundamental dimensions of
social judgment, along with competence, though competence and dominance share many
qualities (Abele, Cuddy, Judd, & Yzerbyt, 2008; Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2008; Freddi,
Tessier, Lacrampe, & Dru, 2013). Nonetheless, while dominance and competence
perceptions are closely related, I have chosen to focus my inquiry on dominance rather
than competence as I believe it is more relevant to the context that I am studying. That is,
dominance, rather than competence, taps more into the emotional aspect of apology
process. Moreover, dominance is more traditionally tied to influence, having been linked
to leadership as well as to influence in smaller group settings (Lord, De Vader, & Alliger,
1986; Anderson & Kilduff, 2009). In addition, my model builds upon prior, related
studies concerning the linkages between power, status, warmth and dominance.
Further, the focus on two dimensions of social judgment harkens back to prior
two-fold conceptualizations in the literature including power vs. love, and agency vs.
communion (Celik, Lammers, van Beest, Bekker, and Vonk, 2013). Indeed, scholars
argue that the existence of two broad classes of social judgment are universally present in
the perception of not just others, but also the self and social groups (Abele & Wojciszke,
2014).
Given the critical link between perceptions of warmth and dominance and one’s
degree of influence, Fragale et al. (2011) linked high and low power, and high and low
status, to these perceptions. The primary goal was to determine whether power and status
lead to different social judgments. They argued that both high power and high status
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would positively predict a target’s perceived dominance; but that high status would be
positively related to perceived warmth while high power would be negatively related to
perceived warmth. Fragale et al. found support for their arguments, along with the
premise that status acts as a moderator of the negative effect of power on warmth. That
is, when status is high, targets are perceived as warm regardless of their level of power.
While the Fragale et al. findings are foundational, they don’t tell us anything
about how the relationships between the variables may be impacted by specific types of
social interactions including offensive acts and apologies. This is significant as people
purposefully engage in certain behaviors in order to appear warmer or more dominant
(Holoien & Fiske, 2013). For those with high power or high status, an apology may be
an effective way to manage others’ perceptions of their warmth and dominance after an
offensive act.
Indeed, I hold that after offending another party, the act of apologizing– as
opposed to not apologizing - will lead to increased perceptions of both warmth and
dominance for those with high power and for those with high status. My argument
regarding dominance is particularly relevant to the apology process as a key reason why
people are reluctant to apologize after an offensive act is a fear of appearing weak or
inadequate (Lazare, 2004), i.e. appearing less dominant. This is why I am focusing this
study on the high power and high status conditions.
My contention is that for those with high power or high status, an apology will not
convey weakness, and may in fact convey strength, and thus this longstanding fear is
overstated. Supportive of this idea, Tucker et al., (2006) found that leaders who
apologized were perceived as more transformational than those who did not apologize.
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However, in this study the victim was subjected to a task-related mistake. By contrast, I
consider contexts in which the victim perceives an interpersonal exchange as offensive.
Thus there are more likely to be emotional implications since negative interactions at
work often result in emotional reactions for people (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996).
I will now discuss in greater detail how high power and high status apologies
should lead to enhanced perceptions of warmth and dominance.
High Power/High Status Apologies and Perceived Warmth
As previously outlined, much of our understanding of the consequences of
apologies is rooted in impression management theory. To this end, apologies can
improve an offender’s situation in a number of important ways. For example, apologies
reduce the blame and anger that victims hold toward offenders, leading victims to punish
offenders less severely (Darby & Schlenker, 1982; Ohbuchi, Kameda, & Agarie, 1989;
DeCremer et al., 2010). Conversely, in cases in which the offender fails to apologize,
there are negative emotional repercussions. Thomas and Millar (2008) found that
participants were angrier at a confederate when the confederate had an opportunity to
apologize and didn’t than when this person did not have the chance to apologize.
However, as previously mentioned, apologies are not universally effective (e.g.
Gold & Weiner, 2000; Skarlicki, Folger, & Gee, 2004). To address this discrepancy in
the literature, Hill (2014) conducted a meta-analysis linking apologies with a series of
outcomes for offended parties: apologizing was significantly related to forgiveness (k =
79, r = .32), positive attributions of the apologizer (k = 60, r = .24), and positive emotions
toward the apologizer (k = 43, r = .33). The latter two correlations provide compelling
evidence that, all else being equal, apologies positively alter how victims view offenders.
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Apologies are able to accomplish this in part because they function as effective
image restoration tools (Benoit, 1995; Benoit & Drew, 1997). Apologies provide
information to the victim about the nature of the offender (Tomlinson et al., 2004). That
is, apologies signal that transgressions should not be deemed a reflection of the offender’s
true identity or intrinsic worth (Goffman, 1967; Ren & Gray, 2009). In this way, an
apology is expected to result in a more positive impression of the offender. Therein lies
the link between apologies and perceived warmth. Perceptions of warmth are deemed
positive, and are typically connected to characteristics such as friendliness, honesty, and
good-naturedness (Tiedens & Jimenez, 2003). Moreover, trustworthiness and likeability
– both aforementioned outcomes of apologies – have been classified in the warmth
dimension (Fiske et al., 2006).
Further, there is some reason to believe that apologies from high power and high
status offenders will be particularly impactful, although evidence is mixed. Walfisch et
al. (2013) found that apologies from high status others were shown to be more effective
than apologies from low status others, with apology effectiveness operationalized as
apology acceptance, willingness to forgive, and valuation of the offender. In a separate
study, supervisor apologies in the wake of interpersonal offenses were shown to
positively impact follower trust in leadership, satisfaction with supervision, LMX quality,
affective organizational commitment, and forgiveness (Basford et al., 2013). By contrast,
scholars have also shown that apologies from high power offenders are relatively
ineffective at increasing forgiveness from low power victims, due to the cynicism with
which these apologies are viewed (Zheng, van Dijke, Leunissen, Giurge, De Cremer,
2016).
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In sum, though evidence concerning the general effectiveness of apologies from
high power and high status offenders is inconclusive, because apologies elicit positive
thoughts and feelings from victims, they should enable high power and high status
offenders to exude more warmth than if the offender had not apologized after an
offensive act. Thus, an apology – relative to no apology - is expected to enhance the
feelings of warmth that victims have toward both high power and high status individuals.
Hypothesis 7: Individuals with high status who apologize after an offensive act are
perceived as warmer than individuals with high status who do not apologize.
Hypothesis 8: Individuals with high power who apologize after an offensive act are
perceived as warmer than individuals with high power who do not apologize.

High Power/High Status Apologies and Perceived Dominance
The perception of one’s dominance is of interest to those with power or status
because, like warmth, it can shape the nature of one’s interactions with targets of
influence. Indeed, prior research holds that the relationship between perceived
dominance and influence is reciprocal in nature (Fragale et al., 2011). Despite this fact,
dominance is a construct that frequently carries a negative connotation, and is often
linked with aggressive, domineering, and controlling tendencies (Burgoon & Dunbar,
2000; Ridgeway, 1987). However, communication scholars Burgoon, Johnson, and Koch
(1998) considered dominance from an interactionist perspective, arguing that perceptions
of dominance are a byproduct of not only the focal party’s personality, but also the
interaction between two parties. This is relevant to the apology process in that an
apology is a transformative interaction between two parties.
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Burgoon et al. (1998) further argued that the negative conceptualization of
dominance is too narrow and too pejorative; by contrast, they contend that socially
competent behaviors lead to perceptions of dominance. To this end Burgoon et al. (1998)
factor-analyzed results from two different samples and found that dominance could be
characterized as inclusive of components of poise, panache, self-assurance,
persuasiveness, and conversational control. Dominant individuals were further deemed
to be more relaxed, composed, and expressive, and to initiate and coordinate
conversation. In a subsequent study, Burgoon and Dunbar (2000) found that selfreported social skills – as measured by the Social Skills Inventory (Riggio, 1986) - were
associated with perceptions of dominance as gauged by interaction partners, observers,
and themselves.
Because apologies fall into the category of behaviors that require social
competence, I argue that they should lead to greater perceptions of dominance. In
particular, apologies demand that one be confident and self-assured, traits that fall under
the dominance dimension (Wiggins, 1979). As I have previously argued, apologies are
difficult and at once require strength and vulnerability, a balance that requires adroit
social skills. Indeed, an apology has been described as an act of courage in which one
must first conquer one’s own fear (Tavuchis, 1991; Taft, 2000). I expect recipients of
apologies to recognize that apologizers are showing initiative and exhibiting strength in
admitting fault, as opposed to shifting blame or denying their wrongdoing.
Apologists must also convince the victim that the apology merits acceptance,
which requires persuasiveness. Further, in as much as an apology represents one’s
willingness to accept responsibility for a wrongful act, one is demonstrating a willingness
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to take the moral high road and shoulder social obligations, another sign of one’s
strength. These factors all increase the likelihood that one who apologizes will be viewed
as more dominant than one who does not.
Hypothesis 9: Individuals with high status who apologize after an offensive act are
perceived as more dominant than individuals with high status who do not apologize.
Hypothesis 10: Individuals with high power who apologize after an offensive act are
perceived as more dominant than individuals with high power who do not apologize.
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Chapter 4: Mechanisms Underlying Power, Status, and the Willingness to Apologize
In Chapter Two I explored whether high and low power, and high and low status,
impact one’s willingness to apologize. Nonetheless, we still don’t know precisely why
this phenomenon occurs. That is, we don’t fully understand the differing psychological
processes that power and status exert as they relate to apologies. For example, I have
argued that high power and low status individuals, respectively, are more unwilling to
apologize, but for different reasons. This contention requires empirical study since the
factors underlying why a high power or low status individual might avoid apologizing is
an important research question that has yet to be addressed. Moreover, from a practical
standpoint, it is important to understand how contextual factors may influence one’s
willingness to apologize so as to better address the underlying causes.
Thus, I will focus on the psychological mechanisms that govern why high power
and low status individuals are less willing to apologize, and why high status and low
power individuals are more willing to apologize. To do this I will introduce the
constructs of remorse and instrumentality perceptions as potential mediating variables for
power and status, respectively, and the willingness to apologize. In sum, my purpose is
to understand more completely the phenomenon of why those with high or low power, or
high or low status, are willing to apologize or not.
High Power and Remorse
As I have previously argued, a principle reason why people fail to apologize is
that they feel justified in their behavior and hence don’t experience guilt and remorse
(Exline et al., 2007). Offenders frequently view their actions as less harmful and more
justifiable than do victims, which in turn creates a psychological barrier to repentance and
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apologies (Exline & Baumeister, 2001). Baumeister (1996) labeled this difference in
perceptions between the offender and victim concerning the nature and seriousness of a
transgression the “magnitude gap”. Essentially I contend that the experience of high
power, and the psychological distance that this creates vis-a-vis others, results in one
being more susceptible to the magnitude gap (Magee & Smith, 2013).
Remorse pertains to the negative feelings that one has relating to the
consequences of one’s behavior (Davis & Gold, 2011; Brooks & Reddon, 2003). To
reiterate a point that I highlighted in Chapter Two, Exline et al. (2007) predicted and
found that apologies were more likely than non-apologies in situations in which the
offender felt genuine remorse. Thus remorse can be seen as a precondition to apologies.
Moreover, victims view remorse as a critical component in the apology process:
perceived remorse reduces the blame and punishment-seeking of victims, and leads to
increased levels of empathy and forgiveness (Davis & Gold, 2011; Darby & Schlenker,
1982). In sum, remorse is a fundamental part of the apology process, both for offenders
and for victims, and can be seen as an intervening variable between high/low power and
intent to apologize.
I contend that remorse is an especially critical factor in the apology process for
high power individuals because they are less likely to apologize for social reasons such as
politeness or coercion. This is because power reduces the impact of social disapproval
(Emerson, 1962). Further, the act of apologizing is a social norm, and power frees
individuals from the weight of social norms (Galinsky et al., 2008). The implication is
that those with high power will need to feel remorse for their behavior in order to compel
them to apologize.
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In an interpersonal context such as the one that I am examining, remorse involves
the internal recognition that one has behaved badly and created negative ramifications for
someone else. One of the key theoretical arguments that I have made is that those with
high power may not be aware that they have behaved in an offensive manner towards
another person. For one, the possession of power leads one to be more focused on goal
pursuit and one’s own self-interest (Guinote, 2007). In this context the psychological
state of an aggrieved party may not be pertinent. Indeed, social distance theory suggests
that those with high power will show less interest in others’ mental state and will not be
as responsive to others’ needs (Magee & Smith, 2013). Supportive of this notion, high
power has been linked to a lack of compassion for others (Van Kleef et al., 2008).
The theory of moral hypocrisy is also supportive of the notion that high power
individuals will experience less remorse following an offensive act. Moral hypocrisy
involves having a double standard concerning one’s view on immoral behavior, and has
been linked to the possession of power (Rustichini & Villeval, 2014). Moral hypocrisy
provides a theoretical frame for understanding why a high power individual may feel
justified in their behavior, even as a victim may feel that he/she deserves an apology.
Across four experiments, Lammers et al. (2010) found that high power
individuals, as opposed to low power individuals, judged their own moral improprieties
less harshly than the improprieties of other people. The implication is that those with
high power will have more psychological freedom to behave badly since the
psychological bar for their misbehavior is higher. Building on this finding, I propose that
high power individuals will also be less likely to feel remorseful about their behavior,
which they may not view as problematic in the first place.
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Hypothesis 11: Individuals with high power will experience less remorse than
individuals in the control group.
Hypothesis 12: Individuals with high power will be less willing to apologize (vs.
control).
Hypothesis 13: Remorse will mediate the relationship between high power and
willingness to apologize.
Low Power and Remorse
In contrast to those with high power, those with low power are expected to
experience more remorse following an interpersonally offensive act. This contention
rests on the notion that those with low power engage in more perspective taking than
those with high power (Galinsky et al., 2006). Perspective taking is the process of
imagining the thoughts and feelings of another person (Galinsky et al., 2006). This is
critical to my argument as perspective taking is related to correctly discerning the
interests of others (Eisenberg, Murphy, & Shepard, 1997), which in turn should be tied to
remorse.
Remorse involves negative sentiment concerning the consequences of one’s
behavior (Exline et al., 2007). In this case I am studying the consequences of one’s
offensive behavior towards another person. It is more likely that one will appreciate the
negative consequences of one’s interpersonal behavior when one understands the point of
view of the victim: this is a consequence of perspective-taking. As a result, the low
power individual is more likely to recognize that this victim’s interests have been
negatively impacted by his/her actions. For this reason I propose that those with low
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power will feel more remorse concerning their offensive behavior.
Moreover, low power individuals will be acutely aware of the negative emotions
that others harbor towards them. This was demonstrated in a study by Anderson and
Berdahl (2002) which found that those with low power overestimated an interaction
partner’s threatening emotions, consisting of anger, contempt, and disgust. I propose that
this inclination should be related to heightened feelings of remorse. Indeed,
overestimating the victim’s negative emotions could result in low power individuals
experiencing even more remorse than the initial offensive behavior would otherwise
dictate.
Hypothesis 14: Individuals with low power will experience more remorse than
individuals in the control group.
Hypothesis 15: Individuals with low power will be more willing to apologize (vs.
control).
Hypothesis 16: Remorse will mediate the relationship between low power and
willingness to apologize.
Low Status and Instrumentality Perceptions
The instrumental perspective on apologizing suggests that offenders’ decision
about whether to apologize is a function of whether offenders believe that they will be
forgiven and thus trusted again (Leunissen et al., 2012). Under this line of reasoning,
offenders gauge the odds of whether the victim will accept their apology before
delivering one: if offenders believe that their apology will be accepted, they should be
more willing to apologize. This was empirically shown in a laboratory study that
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involved actual behavior, both in terms of the offensive act and the apology (Leunissen et
al., 2012).
The underlying logic behind the instrumental perspective is that would-be
apologizers seek positive outcomes and seek to avoid negative outcomes from an
apology, and this motivates their apology behavior. This is consistent with the notion
that apologizers are strategic in deciding whether or not to issue apologies (Lazare, 2004;
Leunissen et al., 2012). The positive outcomes that apologizers seek are forgiveness,
along with some form of reconciliation. By contrast, apologizers seek to avoid the
rejection associated with an unaccepted apology, which is often accompanied by
humiliation and punishment (Exline et al., 2007). Offenders thus gauge whether
apologies will lead to outcomes that are in their best interest: when offenders do not
believe that they will be forgiven, the apology will not be viewed instrumentally and
hence not delivered (Leunissen et al., 2012).
Those with low status, as I have previously argued, should be less confident that
they will be forgiven for their misbehavior. This is because they are not in good social
standing with their peers, people who in the aggregate have less respect and admiration
for them. Victims typically forgive those with whom they want to reconcile and restore a
positive relationship (Bottom, Gibson, Daniels, & Murnighan, 2002). However, those
with low status recognize that their relationships are not strong. They will thus have
lowered expectations concerning their reception from social partners. In short, those with
low status have strong reason to believe that the victim will not desire reconciliation and
will not accept their apology, since the social link is already weak.
Hypothesis 17: Individuals with low status will have lower instrumentality
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perceptions about apologies than individuals in the control group.
Hypothesis 18: Individuals with low status will be less willing to apologize (vs.
control).
Hypothesis 19: Instrumentality perceptions will mediate the relationship between
low status and willingness to apologize.
High Status and Instrumentality Perceptions
High status individuals, by contrast, have strong reason to believe that their
apology will be accepted and that the relationship can be restored. This derives from the
underlying premise that high status individuals reap social benefits by virtue of the
respect and admiration that others have for them (Blau, 1964; Hollander, 1958).
Moreover, these benefits often exist in the mind of the high status individual, thus
yielding more favorable social perceptions and a set of positive expectations concerning
others’ evaluations of the self (Pettit & Sivanathan, 2012).
For example, Lount and Pettit (2012) found that one of the byproducts of high
status is the belief that another person will have benevolent intentions; benevolent
intentions are the degree to which one wants to do good for another. Pettit and
Sivanathan (2012) provide further proof that status cues shape social perceptions: those
with high status reported a higher percentage of seeing smiling faces and hearing
applause following a public performance versus those with low status.
The factors above drive my contention about the positive link between high status
and instrumentality perceptions. High status individuals exist in a world in which they
perceive that interaction partners are welcoming and approving of them (Pettit and
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Sivanathan, 2012). Indeed, I propose that instrumentality perceptions are a natural
extension of the Lount and Pettit (2012) study concerning benevolent intentions.
Because high status individuals perceive that others generally want the best for them,
they should expect that interaction partners will accept their apologies because of the
benefits – trust restoration, forgiveness - that it would provide the high status holder.
Thus, I propose that the high status individual is more likely than the individual in the
control condition to believe that the victim will be accepting of their apology.
Hypothesis 20: Individuals with high status will have higher instrumentality
perceptions about apologies than individuals in the control group.
Hypothesis 21: Individuals with high status will be more willing to apologize (vs.
control).
Hypothesis 22: Instrumentality perceptions will mediate the relationship between
high status and willingness to apologize.
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Chapter 5
Study 1
In order to test the hypotheses concerning one’s willingness to apologize under
conditions of high and low power, and high and low status, I employed an experimental
methodology.
In this experimental design I utilized a vignette that allowed me to control the
nature of the offensive act and the form of the apology, and ultimately to determine
causality. In addition, this design allowed me to distinguish the effects of power and
status, which often co-vary in naturalized settings. My design further enabled me to
clearly differentiate the conditions of high power, low power, control power, high status,
low status, and control status.
I examined the apology process in a dyadic context. I did not manipulate the
power or status of the victim, just that of the offender. While some power/status studies
consider these factors relationally, my goal was to isolate the psychological effect of
power and status on the offending party. In this way, I am making an assumption of
homogeneity across victims.
I also targeted participants with work experience as I consider them better able to
relate to a scenario that involves workplace interactions.
Method
Participants and Design. In this online study, I recruited and compensated
participants via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk), an online marketplace created by
Amazon.com in which “workers” complete computerized tasks that are posted by
“requesters” (Paolacci & Chandler, 2014). Scholars have determined that MTurk worker
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samples are reliable (Paolacci & Chandler, 2014). Further, MTurk workers have been
found to be internally motivated and demographically diverse, particularly along the
dimensions of industry and work experience (Behrend, Sharek, Meade, & Wiebe, 2011;
Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). In the recruitment information, I requested that
only individuals with at least six months of prior work experience in the U.S. participate,
and I limited the recruitment to the U.S.
Participants were 441 individuals (54% male; 46% female) from the United States
with at least six months of prior work experience in the U.S. Participants received $1.20
to complete an approximately 10-minute survey. The mean age was 35.2 (SD = 11.2),
and the participants reported working 38.8 hours (SD = 10.0) per week on average.
Participants were randomly assigned to conditions in a 3 (status: high vs. low vs.
control) x 3 (power: high vs. low vs. control) between-participants experimental design.
All instructions and questions were constructed and delivered using Qualtrics, the survey
software.
Experimental Conditions. Power and status were manipulated using primes
adapted from Blader and Chen (2012), and Petit and Sivanathan (2012). Participants
assigned to the high status/control power and low status/control power condition(s) were
instructed to imagine:
You work at a pharmaceutical company and hold a great deal of (relatively little)
status within this organization. You have (do not have) the sense that your
colleagues really like, respect, and admire you (particularly like, respect, or
admire you). Indeed, you possess a great deal of (little) esteem within the
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organization. Note that this is separate from the level of power that you possess
in the organization.
In the high power/control status and low power/control status condition(s), participants
were instructed to imagine:
You work at a pharmaceutical company and hold a great deal of (relatively little)
power within this organization. Indeed you are one of the most (least) powerful
individuals in the company. You are personally given control over an unusually
large (relatively meager) amount of resources, compared with your peers in other
departments. Note that this is separate from the amount of respect or admiration
that others in the organization feel toward you.
In the high status/high power, high status/low power, low status/high power, and low
status/low power conditions, respectively, participants were given instructions that
included both the power and status manipulations. The status manipulation was always
presented first, followed by the power manipulation. For example, in the high status/high
power condition, participants were instructed to imagine that:
You work at a pharmaceutical company and hold a great deal of status within this
organization. You have the sense that your colleagues really like, respect, and
admire you. Indeed, you possess a great deal of esteem within the organization.
In addition, you hold a great deal of power within this organization. Indeed, you
are one of the most powerful individuals in the company. You are personally
given control over an unusually large amount of resources, compared with your
peers in other departments.
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For the control condition, no such information concerning status or power was provided.
Instead, participants were simply told:
You work at a pharmaceutical company.
Procedure. Following the manipulations, participants were presented with a short
scenario, adapted from Hetrick et al., (2014), that represents an interpersonal offense
from the perspective of an offender. The scenario is as follows:
You are in a work meeting with a group of colleagues in which you are discussing
the product pipeline for the company. At one point in the meeting one of your
colleagues begins to ask a question that you find irrelevant. You interrupt the
colleague and state that the question that the colleague has asked is “stupid” in
front of the rest of the group.
After reading these prompts, participants completed the dependent measure, manipulation
check, and demographic measures, in that order.
Demographic variables. Participants were asked their gender, age, and hours
worked on average per week.
Manipulation Check. Participants were asked two questions to serve as
manipulation checks: “How much power do you have at the company?” and “How much
status do you have at the company?” Both questions were answered on a 5-point scale
ranging from 1 (none at all) to 5 (a great deal).
Dependent Variable. Participants were given the following definition of apology:
“an explicit verbal or written statement of apologetic intent such as ‘I am sorry’ that you
believe is sincere” and asked “How likely are you to apologize to your colleague about
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what happened during the meeting?” The question was answered on a 7-point scale
ranging from 1 (extremely unlikely) to 7 (extremely likely).
Results and Discussion
Neither age (r = .06, p = .22), nor hours worked per week (r = -.04, p = .43),
correlated with willingness to apologize. A one-way ANOVA showed that gender had a
significant effect on willingness to apologize, F(1, 439) = 8.9, p = .003. Women (M =
6.10, SD = 1.35) showed a greater willingness to apologize than did men (M = 5.66, SD
= 1.64). As a result, I included gender as a covariate in models testing willingness to
apologize.
I tested several assumptions before running tests of the hypotheses. I computed
and found Levene’s statistic to be significant, thus I do not have homogeneous variances.
However, my group sample sizes are approximately equal; and SPSS uses a regression
approach for ANOVA, meaning that ANOVA and multiple regression using dummy
variables are mathematically the same, so the problem is less important (Leech, Barrett,
& Morgan, 2015). In addition, I compared box plots and confirmed that the dependent
variable, willingness to apologize, is normally distributed.
Manipulation Checks
A one-way ANOVA showed that the power manipulation had a significant effect
on how much power the participants felt they had at the company, F(2, 438) = 322, p <
.001. Planned contrasts revealed that participants in the high-power condition (M = 4.42,
SD = 0.98) reported a significantly greater sense of power than participants in the control
condition (M = 2.84, SD = 0.90), t(296.6) = 14.49, p < .001, d = 1.57, and than
participants in the low-power condition (M = 1.90, SD = 0.62), t(251.8) = 26.25, p <
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.001, d = 2.52, confirming that the high power manipulation increased sense of power.
Planned contrasts also revealed that the low-power condition participants reported a
significantly lower sense of power than participants in the control condition, t(269.8) = 10.50, p < .001, d = -.94, confirming that the manipulation of low power reduced sense of
power compared to the control condition.
A one-way ANOVA showed that the status manipulation had a significant effect
on how much status they felt they had at the company, F(2, 437) = 91, p < .001. Planned
contrasts revealed that participants in the high-status condition (M = 4.00, SD = 1.15)
reported a significantly greater sense of status than participants in the control condition
(M = 3.04, SD = 1.19), t(294.8) = 7.11, p < .001, d = .96 and than participants in the lowstatus condition (M = 2.23, SD = 0.96), t(273.2) = 14.09, p < .001, d = 1.77, confirming
the manipulation of high status. Planned contrasts also revealed that the low-status
condition participants reported a significantly lower sense of status than participants in
the control condition, t(292) = -6.48, p < .001, d = -.81, confirming that my manipulation
of low status reduced sense of status compared to the control condition.
Willingness to Apologize
To analyze the effect of the power and status on participants’ willingness to
apologize, I conducted a 3x3 between-participants ANCOVA, with power (high vs. low
vs. control) and status (high vs. low vs. control) as the factors, and gender as the
covariate; see Table 1 for Estimated marginal means (EMM).
This analysis revealed that gender was a significant covariate F(1, 431) = 9.72, p
=.002, np2 = .02. There was a main effect of status, F(2, 431) = 4.04, p =.018, np2 = .02.
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There was no main effect of power, F(2, 431) = .45, p = .641, np2 = .00, and there was
not a significant power x status interaction, F(4, 431) = 1.186, p = .316, np2 = .01.
High power participants (EMM = 5.78, SE = 0.12) were no less likely to
apologize than those in the control condition (EMM = 5.83, SE = 0.12), F<1. Low power
(EMM = 5.95, SE = 0.13) and control conditions also did not differ, F<1. Thus
Hypotheses 1 and 2 were not supported.
The high status (EMM = 6.02, SE = 0.13) and control conditions (EMM = 5.98,
SE = 0.12) did not differ, F<1, therefore Hypothesis 3 was not supported. Nonetheless,
those with high status were more willing to apologize than those with low status (EMM =
5.56, SE = 0.13), t(284) = 2.548, p = .011, np2 = .02.
In support of Hypothesis 4, participants experiencing low status (EMM = 5.56, SE
= 0.13) were less willing to apologize compared to those in the control condition (EMM
= 5.98, SE = 0.12), t(298) = -2.447, p = .015, np2 = .01.
Hypothesis 5 predicted that individuals with high status will be more willing to
apologize (vs. control), regardless of whether they have high power, low power, or
control power, and was not supported. Planned comparisons revealed that participants
with high status did not differ in willingness to apologize when they also had high power
(EMM = 6.06, SE = 0.21) as compared to control (EMM = 5.95, SE = 0.22), t(96) = .391,
p = .696, np2 = .00. Similarly, participants with high status were no more willing to
apologize when they had low power (EMM = 6.04, SE = 0.22) compared to the control
(EMM = 6.26, SE = 0.20), t(101) = -.795, p = .427, np2 = .00. Further, there was no
difference in high status participants’ willingness to apologize when power was not
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manipulated (EMM = 5.96, SE = 0.22) vs. control (EMM = 5.73, SE = 0.21), t(98) =
.737, p = .461, np2 = .00. The results are illustrated in Figure 1.
Hypothesis 6 predicted that individuals with low status will be less willing to
apologize (vs. control), regardless of whether they have high power, low power, or
control power, and was partially supported. Planned comparisons revealed that
participants with low status were less willing to apologize when they also had high power
(EMM = 5.34, SE = 0.21) as compared to control (EMM = 5.95, SE = 0.22), t(99) = 2.058, p = .041, np2 = .02. Similarly, participants with low status were also less willing
to apologize when they had low power (EMM = 5.54, SE = 0.25) compared to the control
(EMM = 6.26, SE = 0.20), t(93) = -2.309, p = .022, np2 = .03. However, there was no
difference in low status participants’ willingness to apologize when power was not
manipulated (EMM = 5.80, SE = 0.20) vs. control (EMM = 5.73, SE = 0.21), t(104) =
.232, p = .817, np2 = .000.
In sum, results from Study 1 provide evidence favoring my argument that status
exerts a greater impact than power on the apology process. I found a main effect for
status, but not for power, and in the predicted direction. Low status is related to a
reduced willingness to apologize as compared to the control condition: this is true
regardless of whether participants also possess high power or low power. Moreover, high
status individuals are more willing to apologize than those with low status. I further
explore the underlying mechanisms relating to these dynamics in Study 3.
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Chapter 6
Study 2
In order to test the hypotheses concerning victims’ reactions to apologies from
those with high power and high status, I once again used an experimental design that
employed a vignette methodology. My research objective was ultimately to gauge the
impact of an apology on the influence process, which is why I focused solely on high
power and high status.
Method
Participants and Design. As with Study 1, I recruited and compensated
participants via MTurk, the online marketplace for completing tasks. In the recruitment
information, I requested that only individuals with at least six months of prior work
experience in the U.S. participate, and I limited the recruitment to the U.S.
Participants were 196 individuals (54% male; 46% female) from the United States
with at least six months of prior work experience in the U.S. Participants received $1.20
to complete an approximately 10-minute survey. The mean age was 35.4 (SD = 11.0),
and the participants reported working 36.7 hours (SD = 11.0) per week on average.
Participants were randomly assigned to conditions in a 2 (high status vs. high
power) x 2 (apology vs. no apology) between-participants experimental design. All
instructions and questions were constructed and delivered using Qualtrics.
Procedure. Participants were presented with a short scenario, adapted from
Hetrick et al., (2014), that represents an interpersonal offense. Unlike Study 1, the
scenario is from the perspective of the victim and not the offender. The scenario that
participants viewed is as follows:
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You work at a pharmaceutical company, and you are in a work meeting with a
group of colleagues. At one point in the meeting you begin to ask a question
about the product pipeline. At that point one of your colleagues interrupts you
and states that the question that you have posed is “stupid” in front of the rest of
the group.
Power and status were manipulated using primes adapted from Blader and Chen
(2012) and Petit and Sivanathan (2012). Participants assigned to the high status condition
were instructed to imagine:
The person who interrupted you (“R”) has a great deal of status in your
organization and is generally liked, respected, and admired by everyone in the
organization.
Participants assigned to the high power condition were instructed to imagine:
R has a great deal of power in your organization and controls an unusually large
amount of resources compared with others in the organization.
Participants assigned to the apology condition were then instructed to imagine:
The following day R apologized to you for the interruption and for being rude. R
promised you that it would never happen again. You believe that R’s apology
was sincere.
For the no apology condition, no such information concerning an apology from R was
provided.
Demographic variables. Participants were asked their gender, age, and hours
worked on average per week.
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Dependent Variables. After being told about the apology or not, participants
were asked about their perceptions of R.
Perception of Warmth. Participants were asked to “indicate the extent to which
each of the following terms describes the person who interrupted you”, taken from
Wiggins (1979) and Fragale et al. (2011): cordial, respectful, cooperative, agreeable,
impolite (r), disrespectful (r), uncooperative (r), and quarrelsome (r). The questions were
answered on a 9-point scale ranging from 1 (extremely inaccurate description) to 9
(extremely accurate description).
Perception of Dominance. Participants were asked to “indicate the extent to
which each of the following terms describes the person who interrupted you”, taken from
Wiggins (1979) and Fragale et al. (2011): assertive, forceful, self-assured, dominant,
submissive (r), unassertive (r), and timid (r). The questions were answered on a 9-point
scale ranging from 1 (extremely inaccurate description) to 9 (extremely accurate
description).
Results
I conducted principal axis factor analysis with varimax rotation to assess the
underlying structure for the 15 items used to measure the perceptions of the offender.
Two factors were requested based on the fact that the items were designed to index two
constructs, warmth and dominance. After rotation, the first factor accounted for 49.1% of
the variance and the second factor accounted for 15.4% of the variance. Table 2 displays
the items and factor loadings for the rotated factors, with loadings less than .40 omitted to
improve clarity. As expected, the first factor appears to index to warmth, while the
second factor appears to index to dominance. I computed Cronbach’s alpha to test for
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reliability for the two dependent variables, warmth and dominance: the alpha for warmth
was .940; the alpha for dominance was .853. Thus, both variables demonstrated good
internal consistency (Leech et al., 2015).
Gender (r = -.012, p = .86), age (r = -.112, p = .12), and hours worked per week (r
= -.126, p = .08) were not correlated with warmth perceptions. Gender (r = .052, p = .47)
and hours worked per week (r = .063, p = .38) were not correlated with dominance
perceptions; however, age was correlated with dominance perceptions (r = .239, p =
.001). Because the correlation between age and dominance perceptions was significant,
and because the correlation between age and warmth perceptions approached
significance, I included age as a covariate in models testing warmth and dominance.
I tested several assumptions before running tests of the hypotheses. I tested the
assumption of homogeneity of variances by computing the Levene statistic: the test was
not significant; thus the homogeneity of variances assumption is not violated. In
addition, because the samples for my groups are approximately equal, the Box test can be
ignored and Pillai's trace used for the Multivariate statistic (Leech et al., 2015).
I conducted a two factor MANCOVA to assess whether victims perceive high
status vs. high power offenders who apologize versus those who don’t apologize as
warmer or more dominant, with age of the victim as a covariate; see Tables 2 and 3 for
Estimated marginal means (EMM). MANCOVA works best when the two dependent
variables are negatively correlated, as they are in my study (r = -.513, p <.001), (Leech et
al., 2015).
This analysis revealed that age was a significant covariate, Pillai’s Trace = .049,
F(2, 190) = 4.891, p=.008, multivariate η2= .049. There was a main effect of apology,
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Pillai’s Trace = .291, F(2, 190) = 38.930, p<.001, multivariate η2= .291. There was no
main effect of context (high power/high status), Pillai’s Trace = .004, F(2, 190) = .366,
p=.694, multivariate η2= .004, and there was not a significant apology x context
interaction, Pillai’s Trace = .002, F(2, 190) = .186, p=.831, multivariate η2= .002.
Follow up univariate analyses are presented in Table 5. Age was a significant
covariate for dominance (p =.002), but not warmth (p=.161). The main effect of an
apology versus no apology was significant for warmth (p <.001), but not dominance (p =
.062). Victims perceived those who apologized as warmer but no more or less dominant
that those who did not apologize. There was no difference between high status and high
power for warmth (p = .460) or dominance (p = .454). Thus, Hypotheses 7 and 8 were
supported, while Hypotheses 9 and 10 were not supported.

68

Chapter 7
Studies 3a and 3b
In Study 1 found evidence that there is an effect of status, but not power, on
willingness to apologize. It is thus worth exploring the underlying psychology of status
and power to add additional insight into why these contextual factors differ relative to
one’s willingness to apologize. In order to test the hypotheses concerning the mediating
mechanisms underlying power, status, and the willingness to apologize, I once again
employed an experimental design involving a vignette methodology.
In Study 3a, I manipulated power and examined whether remorse mediates the
relationship between power and the willingness to apologize. In Study 3b, I manipulated
status and examined whether instrumentality perceptions mediate the relationship
between status and the willingness to apologize.

Study 3a
Method
Participants and Design. As with Studies 1 and 2, I recruited and compensated
participants via MTurk, the online marketplace for completing tasks. In the recruitment
information, I requested that only individuals with at least six months of prior work
experience in the U.S. participate, and I limited the recruitment to the U.S.
Participants were 148 individuals (55% male; 45% female) from the United States
with at least six months of prior work experience in the U.S. Participants received $1.20
to complete an approximately 10-minute survey. The mean age was 34.3 (SD = 10.4),
and the participants reported working 38.7 hours (SD = 95) per week on average.

69

Participants were randomly assigned to a high power, low power, or control
condition. All instructions and questions were constructed and delivered using Qualtrics.
Experimental Conditions. Like Study 1, power was manipulated using primes
adapted from Blader and Chen (2012) and Petit and Sivanathan (2012). Participants
assigned to the high power condition were instructed to imagine:
You work at a pharmaceutical company and hold a great deal of power within this
organization. Indeed you are one of the most powerful individuals in the
company. You are personally given control over an unusually large amount of
resources, compared with your peers in other departments. Note that this is
separate from the amount of respect or admiration that others in the organization
feel toward you.
Participants assigned to the low power condition were instructed to imagine:
You work at a pharmaceutical company and hold relatively little power within
this organization. Indeed you are one of the least powerful individuals in the
company. You are personally given control over a relatively meager amount of
resources, compared with your peers in other departments. Note that this is
separate from the amount of respect or admiration that others in the organization
feel toward you.
For the control condition, no such information concerning power was provided to the
participants. Instead participants were simply told that they:
Work at a pharmaceutical company.

70

Procedure. Following the manipulations, participants were presented with a short
scenario, adapted from Hetrick et al., (2014), that represents an interpersonal offense
from the perspective of an offender. The scenario is as follows:
You are in a work meeting with a group of colleagues in which you are discussing
the product pipeline for the company. At one point in the meeting one of your
colleagues begins to ask a question that you find irrelevant. You interrupt the
colleague and state that the question that the colleague has asked is “stupid” in
front of the rest of the group.
After reading these prompts, participants completed the dependent measure, manipulation
check, and demographic measures, in that order.
Demographic variables. Participants were asked their gender, age, and hours
worked on average per week.
Manipulation Check. Participants were asked one question to serve as a
manipulation check: “How much power do you have at the company?” The question was
answered on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (none at all) to 5 (a great deal).
Remorse. Remorse was measured with three items adapted from Exline et al.
(2007); the three items were averaged to assess remorse (α = .91) in that study. The
items are: “How much regret do you have about what happened during the meeting?”;
“How much guilt or remorse do you have about what happened during the meeting?”;
and “How committed are you to not behaving in that way again?” The questions were
answered on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (very little) to 7 (a great deal).
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Dependent Variable. Participants were given the following definition of an
apology: “an explicit verbal or written statement of apologetic intent such as ‘I am sorry’
that you believe is sincere” and asked “How likely are you to apologize to your colleague
about what happened during the meeting?” The question was answered on a 7-point
scale ranging from 1 (extremely unlikely) to 7 (extremely likely).
Results and Discussion
I computed Cronbach’s alpha to test for reliability for the variable remorse: the
alpha was .918, thus demonstrating good internal consistency (Leech et al., 2015).
Remorse was correlated with willingness to apologize (r = .754, p < .001).
A one-way ANOVA showed that gender did not have a significant effect on
remorse, F(1, 148) = 1.90, p = .171, or on willingness to apologize, F(1, 148) = 2.5, p =
.118. Hours worked per week was not correlated with remorse, (r = .05, p = .557) or with
willingness to apologize, (r = -.01, p = .895). However, age was correlated with remorse,
(r = .18, p = .029), and with willingness to apologize (r = .26, p = .002). As a result, I
included age as a covariate in models testing remorse and willingness to apologize.
Manipulation Check
A one-way ANOVA showed that the power manipulation had a significant effect
on how much power the participants felt they had at the company, F(2, 147) = 81, p <
.001. Planned contrasts revealed that participants in the high-power condition (M = 4.34,
SD = 1.10) reported a significantly greater sense of power than participants in the control
condition (M = 2.89, SD = 0.69), t(81.4) = 7.99, p < .001, d = 1.45 and than participants
in the low-power condition (M = 2.04, SD = .87), t(91.9) = 11.4, p < .001, d = 2.30,
confirming that high power increased sense of power. Planned contrasts also revealed
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that the low-power condition participants reported a significantly lower sense of power
than participants in the control condition, t(85.6) = -5.3, p < .001, d = -..85, confirming
that my manipulation of low power reduced sense of power compared to the control
condition.
Remorse
A one-way ANCOVA, with power as the factor and age as the covariate, showed
that power did not have a significant effect on remorse, F(2, 144) = 1.599, p = .206.
Hypothesis 11 predicted that individuals with high power will experience less
remorse than individuals in the control group, and was not supported. Planned
comparisons revealed that there was no difference in remorse between high power
participants (EMM = 4.13, SE = .14) and control participants (EMM = 3.90, SE = .14,
t(102) = 1.15, p =.254, d = .23.
Hypothesis 14 predicted that individuals with low power will experience more
remorse than individuals in the control group and was not supported. Planned
comparisons revealed that there was no difference in remorse between low power
participants (EMM = 4.25, SE = .15) and control participants (EMM = 3.90, SE = .14),
t(98) = 1.752, p =.082, d = .35.
Further, there was no difference in remorse between high power participants and
low power participants, t(93) = -.600, p =.550, d = -.12.
Willingness to Apologize
A one-way ANCOVA, with power as the factor and age as the covariate, showed
that power did not have a significant effect on willingness to apologize, F(2, 144) = .052,
p =.949.
73

Hypothesis 12 predicted that individuals with high power will be less willing to
apologize than those in the control group, and was not supported. Planned comparisons
revealed that there was no difference in willingness to apologize between high power
participants (EMM = 6.17, SE = .17) and control participants (EMM = 6.20, SE = .16),
t(102) = -.134, p =.893, d = -.03.
Hypothesis 15 predicted that individuals with low power will be more willing to
apologize than those in the control group, and was not supported. Planned comparisons
revealed that there was no difference in willingness to apologize between low power
participants (EMM = 6.25, SE = .17) and control participants (EMM = 6.20, SE = .16),
t(98) = .196, p =.845, d = .05.
Further, there was no difference in willingness to apologize between high power
participants and low power participants, t(93) = -.322, p =.748, d = -.08.
Mediation
I used Hayes and Preacher’s (2014) approach to mediation analysis with a
multicategorical independent variable. The model, parameter estimates, and model fit
statistics provide the information about how k groups differ from each other; and the
approach enables simultaneous hypothesis tests (Hayes & Preacher, 2014). Further, with
the bootstrapping approach to mediation, one does not need to find evidence of a direct
effect in order to test for and find mediation (MacKinnon, Lockwood, & Williams, 2004).
I dummy (or indicator) coded the groups, following the system outlined by Hayes
and Preacher. I coded the control power condition as 1, low power condition as 2, and
high power condition as 3, as per Hayes and Preacher recommendation, with the control
condition as the reference group. Using these codes and SPSS, which estimates a linear
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model, I found estimated model coefficients, I derived group means, and I determined
standardized mean differences similar to Cohen’s d.
To test the hypotheses that power influences willingness to apologize through
remorse, I used bootstrapping mediation analysis, with age as a covariate, using the SPSS
PROCESS macro (Hayes & Preacher, 2014) (bias-corrected, 5,000 resamples). I found
no evidence of mediation (Omnibus 95% confidence interval = -.0115 to .0562; see Fig. 4
for the path coefficients for low power and high power). Thus Hypothesis 13 and
Hypothesis 16, which predicted that remorse would mediate the relationship between
high and low power, respectively, and willingness to apologize, were not supported.
In sum, in Study 3a I found no direct effect of power on willingness to apologize,
which is consistent with Study 1 and contrary to my theorizing. Further, I did not find an
indirect effect of power on willingness to apologize through the mediating mechanism of
remorse.
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Study 3b
Method
Participants and Design. As with Study 1, Study 2, and Study 3a, I recruited and
compensated participants via MTurk, the online marketplace for completing tasks. In
the recruitment information, I requested that only individuals with at least six months of
prior work experience in the U.S. participate, and I limited the recruitment to the U.S.
Participants were 148 individuals (51% male; 49% female) from the United States
with at least six months of prior work experience in the U.S. Participants received $1.20
to complete an approximately 10-minute survey. The mean age was 35.3 (SD = 10.5),
and the participants reported working 38.2 hours (SD = 10.5) per week on average.
Participants were randomly assigned to a high status, low status, or control
condition. All instructions and questions were constructed and delivered using Qualtrics.
Experimental Conditions. Like Study 1, status was manipulated using primes
adapted from Blader and Chen (2012) and Petit and Sivanathan (2012). Participants
assigned to the high status condition were instructed to imagine:
You work at a pharmaceutical company and hold a great deal of status within this
organization. You have the sense that your colleagues really like, respect, and
admire you. Indeed, you possess a great deal of esteem within the organization.
Note that this is separate from the level of power that you possess in the
organization.
Participants assigned to the low status condition were instructed to imagine:
You work at a pharmaceutical company and hold relatively little status within this
organization. You do not have the sense that your particularly like, respect, or
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admire you. Indeed, you possess little esteem within the organization. Note that
this is separate from the level of power that you possess in the organization.
For the control condition, no such information concerning status was provided to the
participants. Instead participants were simply told that they:
Work at a pharmaceutical company.
Procedure. Following the manipulations, participants were presented with a short
scenario, adapted from Hetrick et al., (2014), that represents an interpersonal offense
from the perspective of an offender. The scenario is as follows:
You are in a work meeting with a group of colleagues in which you are discussing
the product pipeline for the company. At one point in the meeting one of your
colleagues begins to ask a question that you find irrelevant. You interrupt the
colleague and state that the question that the colleague has asked is “stupid” in
front of the rest of the group.
After reading these prompts, participants completed the dependent measure, manipulation
check, and demographic measures, in that order.
Demographic variables. Participants were asked their gender, age, and hours
worked on average per week.
Manipulation Check. Participants were asked one question to serve as a
manipulation check: “How much status do you have at the company?” The question was
answered on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (none at all) to 5 (a great deal).
Instrumentality Perceptions. Instrumentality perceptions were measured with
three items adapted from Leunissen et al. (2012); the three items were averaged to assess
instrumentality perceptions (α = .85) in that study. The items are: “To what extent do
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you think an apology is important for your colleague?”; “How effective do you think an
apology will be to restore your relationship with your colleague?”; and “To what extent
do you think an apology will repair the damaged trust between you and your colleague?”.
The questions were answered on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very
much so).
Dependent Variable. Participants were given the following definition of an
apology: “an explicit verbal or written statement of apologetic intent such as ‘I am sorry’
that you believe is sincere” and asked “How likely are you to apologize to your colleague
about what happened during the meeting?” The question was answered on a 7-point
scale ranging from 1 (extremely unlikely) to 7 (extremely likely).
Results and Discussion
I computed Cronbach’s alpha to test for reliability for the variable instrumentality
perceptions: the alpha was .530. Neither the validity nor the reliability of the scale were
improved by excluding any single item.
Instrumentality perceptions were correlated with willingness to apologize (r =
.329, p < .001)
Hours worked per week was not correlated with instrumentality perceptions, (r =
.10, p = .221) or with willingness to apologize, (r = -.10, p = .222). Age was not
correlated with instrumentality perceptions, (r = -.11, p = .182), or with willingness to
apologize (r = .13, p = .107).
A one-way ANOVA showed that gender did not have a significant effect on
instrumentality perceptions, F(1, 146) = .163, p = .687. However, gender did have a
significant effect on willingness to apologize, F(1, 146) = 10.3, p = .002. Women (M =
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6.43, SD = .99) showed a greater willingness to apologize than did men (M = 5.83, SD =
1.27). As a result, I included gender as a covariate in models testing willingness to
apologize.
Manipulation Check
A one-way ANOVA showed that the status manipulation had a significant effect
on how much status the participants felt they had at the company, F(2, 145) = 41.1, p <
.001. Planned contrasts revealed that participants in the high-status condition (M = 4.15,
SD = 1.03) reported a significantly greater sense of status than participants in the control
condition (M = 3.18, SD = .91), t(99.8) = 5.01, p < .001, d = .97 and than participants in
the low-status condition (M = 2.37, SD = 1.00), t(95.8) = 8.75, p < .001, d = 1.78,
confirming that high status increased sense of status. Planned contrasts also revealed
that the low-status condition participants reported a significantly lower sense of status
than participants in the control condition, t(90.7) = -4.16, p < .001, d = -.81, confirming
that my manipulation of low status reduced sense of status compared to the control
condition.
Instrumentality Perceptions
A one-way ANOVA showed that status had a significant effect on instrumentality
perceptions, F(2, 145) = 5.892, p =.003.
Hypothesis 17 predicted that individuals with low status will have lower
instrumentality perceptions about apologies than individuals in the control group, and
was supported. Planned comparisons revealed that the difference in instrumentality
perceptions between low status participants (M = 2.96, SD = .72) and control participants
(M = 3.29, SD = .67) was significant, t(91.5) = -2.251, p = .027, d = -.32.
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Hypothesis 20 predicted that individuals with high status will have higher
instrumentality perceptions about apologies than individuals in the control group, and
was not supported. Planned comparisons revealed that there was no difference in
instrumentality perceptions between high status participants (M = 3.46, SD = .77) and
control participants (M = 3.29, SD = .67), t(99.7) = .1.211, p = .228, d = .17.
Further, the difference in instrumentality perceptions between high status
participants and low status participants was significant, t(96.4) = 3.315, p < .001, d = .50.
Willingness to Apologize
A one-way ANCOVA, with status as the factor and gender as the covariate,
showed that status had a significant effect on willingness to apologize, F(2,144) = 3.273,
p =.041.
Hypothesis 18 predicted that individuals with low status will be less willing to
apologize than those in the control group, and was supported. Planned comparisons
revealed that the difference in willingness to apologize between low status participants
(EMM = 5.77, SE = .17) and control participants (EMM = 6.28, SE = .16) was
significant, t(94) = -2.213, p = .028, d =-.51.
Hypothesis 21 predicted that individuals with high status will be more willing to
apologize than those in the control group, and was not supported. Planned comparisons
revealed that the difference in willingness to apologize between high status participants
(EMM = 6.28, SE = .15) and control participants (EMM = 6.28, SE = .16) was not
significant, t(101) = .001, p = .999, d = .00.
Further, the difference in willingness to apologize between high status
participants and low status participants was significant, t(98) =2.258, p = .03, d = .51.
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Mediation
Like Study 3a, I used Hayes and Preacher’s (2014) approach to mediation
analysis with a multicategorical independent variable. I indicator coded the control status
condition as 1, low status condition as 2, and high status condition as 3, with the control
condition as the reference group.
To test the hypotheses that status influences willingness to apologize through
instrumentality perceptions, I used bootstrapping mediation analysis, with gender as a
covariate, using the SPSS PROCESS macro (Hayes & Preacher, 2014) (bias-corrected,
5,000 resamples). This analysis confirmed mediation (Omnibus 95% confidence interval
= .0014 to .0900; see Fig. 5 for the path coefficients for low status and high status); low
status indirectly affected willingness to apologize through lower instrumentality
perceptions.
Thus Hypothesis 19, which predicted that instrumentality perceptions would
mediate the relationship between low status and willingness to apologize, was supported;
and Hypothesis 22, which predicted that instrumentality perceptions would mediate
relationship between high status and willingness to apologize, was not supported.
In sum, in Study 3b I found a direct effect of status on willingness to apologize,
which is consistent with Study 1 and with my theorizing. Further, I found an indirect
effect of low status on willingness to apologize through the mediating mechanism of
instrumentality perceptions. This finding is also consistent with my theorizing. By
contrast, I found no evidence of a mediating mechanism concerning high status and
willingness to apologize.
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Chapter 8: General Discussion
In this dissertation, I studied how power and status impact the apology process,
both as predictors of the willingness to apologize, and as factors shaping victim
perceptions of offenders in the aftermath of an apology.
First, in both Study 1 and Study 3b I found that those with low status were less
willing to apologize than those with high status and than those in the control condition.
However, I did not find a difference based on power on willingness to apologize. These
findings add to our understanding of the psychology of both status and power,
particularly as it relates to how these factors differ. Indeed, it appears that one’s status,
and not one’s power, influences whether one is willing to apologize after committing an
interpersonal offense. In addition, I explored two underlying psychological mechanisms
that have been shown to play a role in the apology process, remorse and instrumentality
perceptions. I determined that for those with low status, instrumentality perceptions
influence one’s willingness to apologize.
Further, I explored the impact that interpersonal apologies from high power and
high status individuals have on victims’ perceptions of the offender. I focused on high
power and high status in particular because these social factors are commonly believed to
be apology deterrents, due to the supposed negative ramifications of an apology. In this
vein, I proposed and found that there are positive social implications for high power and
high status apologizers. More specifically, I found that both high status and high power
offenders who apologize – relative to those who don’t – are seen as warmer and no less
dominant by victims.
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There are several important theoretical and practical implications from these
findings. Scholars have primarily focused on the components of an effective apology; by
contrast there is relatively little research concerning contextual antecedents of apologies
(Exline et al., 2007). This is consistent with the broader notion that research on
relationship repair after conflict has often yielded contradictory findings concerning
repair strategies, including apologies (Ren & Gray, 2009).
Further, due to the ubiquitous nature of power and status dynamics in social
settings, it is important for researchers to include these factors in our understanding of the
apology process. Scholars have begun to parse out the separate psychological effects of
power and status (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). This dissertation is the first time to my
knowledge that power and status – as defined herein – have been empirically contrasted
relative to the apology process. My findings shed light on an important difference
between power and status relative to the apology process. This represents a contribution
to the power, status, and apology literatures.
Blader and Chen (2012) contend that there is a gap in the literature concerning
how power and status holders interact with others. These researchers focused on the
degree of fairness that power and status holders exhibit towards others. My work on
willingness to apologize provides additional insight into how power and status shape
interpersonal dynamics. Moreover, since status has been studied less extensively than
has power, my findings concerning status and apologies are particularly impactful to the
status literature.
One crucial distinction between power and status is that power, as I have defined
it, is a property of the actor, while status results from the observations of third parties
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(Magee & Galinsky, 2008). Building on these definitions, I argue that the expectations –
or lack thereof - of others serves to either stimulate or stifle an apology. This may help to
explain why I found an effect for status, and not for power. What’s more, the finding that
low status individuals are less willing to apologize is consistent with the idea that the fear
of rejection is a big impediment to apologizing (Tavuchis, 1991).
It is important to note that power can also be viewed in a strictly relational sense,
which means that an actor may exert his/her power depending on the presence of
different counterparties. I did not explore this dynamic in my study, and perhaps this
provides an explanation as to why I did not find an effect for power. In addition, those
with high power tend to be more effective at goal pursuit, and an apology may be viewed
as an effective tool to achieve social goals. This dynamic may have outweighed the
impediments to apologizing.
With respect to the outcome of apologies, my research adds to the apology
literature by linking apologies to perceptions of warmth and dominance. Much of the
research on the aftermath of apologies pertains to relationship repair, focusing on
constructs such as trust and forgiveness. By contrast, I demonstrate that apologies do not
harm fundamental social perceptions that victims possess about high power and high
status offenders. Prior apology studies that did focus on perceptions were concerned with
more generalized positive and negative impressions, and thus my findings add
complexity to our understanding of the aftermath of apologies. My results can also be
seen as in line with prior research that showed that victims look more favorably on
apologizers following unintentional transgressions that do not generate doubts about
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offender’s integrity. This is because my focus was on one brief, negative interaction that
was not overly severe in nature and not necessarily indicative of one’s character.
My research also extends our understanding of the influence process, and
represents a novel application of the ELM (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). While power and
status have already been linked with perceptions of warmth and dominance (Fragale et
al., 2011), we have a limited understanding of how these perceptions change following
events like offensive acts and apologies. This research helps to build a more fluid picture
of how we perceive those with high power and high status by showing how apologies can
shape our perceptions of them.
From a practical standpoint, a deeper understanding of how power and status
impact the apology process is applicable to many social contexts, particularly within
organizations. Power and status are ubiquitous factors in organizations. Individuals in
organizations may transgress or act in offensive ways for a host of reasons, not the least
of which is stress induced by excessive job demands, role conflict, work-life balance
issues, and other pressures. Moreover, leaders and others in organizations may
experience relationship conflict with their colleagues, which has deleterious effects on
team performance (de Wit, Greer, & Jehn, 2012). Leader trust-repair strategies such as
apologies are thus critical, not only because leaders transgress, but also because leader
transgressions are often either unintentional or beyond leaders’ control (Shapiro, Boss,
Salas, Tangirala, & Von Glinow, 2011).
In short, there is an important role for interpersonal apologies by leaders and
others at various levels of the organizational hierarchy, which is why we must understand
the potential impediments to apologies by these individuals. Apologizing is hard to do,
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and so it especially important to determine who among us is likely to be most resistant to
the act. By demonstrating that low status individuals are less likely to apologize, these
individuals can potentially adjust their thinking and behavior. This would seem
especially important for low status individuals who are already lacking in social capital
within an organization, a deterrent to career success (Seibert, Kraimer, & Liden, 2001).
Indeed, low status individuals would seem to be the group that has the most to gain by
apologizing, which makes it unfortunate that they would be less willing to do so. To
address this, organizations might become more effective in designing targeted
interventions such as apology trainings.
Further, results from my study allow us to draw the conclusion that status is a
more important factor than power in determining who is willing to apologize. This is
important as it allows individuals and organizations to hone in on the presence or absence
of status, rather than power, as a key clue in devising apology strategies related to
conflict resolution. My results may be seen as an additional negative factor related to low
status, but one that can be potentially remedied through training and ultimately
behavioral modification.
The other significant practical implication from this study derives from the
finding that for those with high power and high status, interpersonal apologies are
beneficial acts in terms of retaining influence. It is important to note that this may be in
contrast to favorable leadership behavior in a more public context. Indeed, organizational
leaders may look at the benefit that public figures, such as politicians, derive from not
apologizing and determine that it is also in their best interests not to apologize. However,
my research demonstrates that in an interpersonal context there are clear benefits to
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apologizing. This is because an apology will not only soothe the victim, but also enhance
the perception of one’s warmth, with no diminishment to the perception of one’s
dominance. This likely results in the offender gaining more interpersonal influence
following the apology, versus no apology. As such, my study shows that high status and
high power offenders have a compelling reason to apologize should the circumstances
dictate, perhaps making this simple act more likely to occur in practice.
Limitations and Future Directions
My conclusions should be considered in light of some limitations. First, the scope
of my studies was quite narrow. I examined a small part of a large and complex
phenomenon, the apology process. My boundary conditions restrict my inquiry such that
I do not account for a host of factors that might affect power- and status-holders’
willingness to apologize in the real world. For example, I do not take into account social
factors such as national culture, or the culture of the theoretical organization in question,
nor do I account for relevant group norms. I also do not account for important
individual-level factors such as cognition, personality, and ethics, among others. In
short, I excluded many factors that should be included in a more expansive and
explanatory apology model.
The constructs that I have selected for this dissertation, as well as the definitions
of these constructs, limit the generalizability of my findings. Scholars have defined
power and status in a variety of ways over time and across disciplines. The differences
between these various definitions and the definitions that I have selected in this
dissertation have important implications for my theoretical model.
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For one, my definition of power focuses on control over external resources. My
theoretical model would differ if my conceptualization of power incorporated intrinsic,
internalized sources. For example, one’s knowledge or expertise gives one power in
various contexts, particularly in the workplace (French & Raven, 1959). Conversely, to
the extent that one is lacking expertise, one becomes highly dependent on other
individuals. Similarly, I do not account for one’s charisma or referent power that can be
exerted in various contexts, regardless of external forces (French & Raven, 1959). Like
power that is derived externally, internalized power might drive one’s willingness to
apologize. Indeed, these internalized power dynamics may supersede the dynamics
rooted in external sources, depending on the context. As a result, in this dissertation I
may be understating the true role of power in the apology process. The internalized
conception of power should thus be included in future work that links power to
willingness to apologize.
Regarding status, I have defined this construct in terms of the prestige, respect,
admiration, and esteem that others hold for an individual. However, like power,
definitions of status have varied over time and across studies (Piazza & Castellucci,
2014). Indeed, some scholars see status as originating from a social ranking, driven in
part by intrinsic factors including one’s personality or physical attractiveness, and
determined by the consensus of the group (e.g., Anderson, John, Keltner, & Kring, 2001).
One’s social ranking may also be driven by one’s place in a formal hierarchy. Regardless
of the source, an assessment of one’s social worth would be antecedent to status as I have
defined it. That is, prestige and respect would flow from this alternative notion of status.
Moreover, there would seem to be aspects of comparative social worth that impact the
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willingness to apologize: for example, the saliency and uniformity of the ranking, and the
competitiveness of the environment. Thus, one step for future research would be to
include an assessment of an offender’s social ranking in the theoretical model linking
status and willingness to apologize.
I omit at least two other aspects of status from my studies that have implications
for my conclusions. First, I do not account for the specific social group that one places
oneself at any given time. One may feel high or low status generally, but this may vary
from moment to moment as one moves through various social circles. The fluid nature of
status and its impact on the apology process should be explored more fully by scholars.
Second, I do not account for the level of respect and admiration that the offender has for
the victim. This assessment of the victim’s status by the offender is separate from, but
may be impacted by, the status level of the offender. These are critical features of status
in the real world that constrain my conclusions about one’s willingness to apologize in a
given context.
Beyond my definitions of power and status, two other key features of my studies
limit the generalizability of my findings. First, the hypothetical offense that I used in the
experiments cannot represent the large range of offenses that occur in the real world.
Second, my experiments involve a simple, basic, and sincere apology that does not
represent the multiple forms of apologies that offenders can make, or that victims desire.
In addition, my priming manipulations of status and power, and my use of
vignettes, represent significant threats to external validity. The primary benefit of using
vignettes and primes is to eliminate confounds and to establish causality. However, there
is a question as to how my primes of power and status translate to a real-world setting.
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The primes create a psychological state of power and status for participants, but the
sensation is by definition finite and bounded, and the scenario as a whole is fleeting. The
experience of reading a prime simply cannot equate to the real-world experience of
possessing power or status. This may explain why my effect sizes are relatively small,
which in turn restricts the breadth and depth of my practical implications. That is, with a
relatively small effect size, it is hard to gauge just how meaningful power and status are
in the overall apology process.
In practice, however, one’s sense of power and status is more deeply ingrained,
and thus more impactful. As a result, I would expect the psychological effect of status
and power on willingness to apologize to be even stronger in a natural environment,
particularly if there are environmental cues that trigger one’s sense of power/status. For
example, if one participates in a series of meetings, an activity not uncommon in the
workplace, one’s sense of status should be primed. Similarly, if one is in a position to
make – or is subject to – budgetary or staffing decisions, power should also be primed.
The psychological impact of these, and many other, real-world primes should be far
greater than the primes in my experiment. Indeed, a stronger sense of power in reality
may influence the apology process in ways that I did not find. This is a research question
that should be explored.
My findings might also be impacted by the specific nature of my experimental
procedure. First I separated the priming language from the vignette that outlines the
offense. This creates a momentary gap in the mind of the participant that might lessen
the psychological impact of the prime and the link to willingness to apologize. In
addition, I always present the status manipulation first, before the power manipulation;
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this might artificially increase the impact of status versus power. However, this only
applies to Study 1; in Study 3, I replicate my findings from Study 1, while separately
testing power and status.
In a more general sense, notwithstanding results from these lab studies, it is
difficult to make predictions about the antecedents and outcomes of apologies given the
complexity of human relationships. In a naturalized setting, there is likely to be some
type of historical relationship between the two parties, something that my studies do not
take into account. The existence of any sort of pre-existing attitudes and feelings held by
the respective parties would affect the apology process, both in terms of the antecedents
to the apology, and the aftermath of the apology. Nonetheless, for my purposes it was
more important to isolate the effects of power and status, and in order to accomplish this
goal the best option was an experiment.
Moreover, I conducted the experiments using online workers who were paid small
amounts for their participation, and thus there is a question as to how representative this
sample is in terms of the wider workplace population. Nonetheless, the pool of available
workers on MTuck is large and diverse, and self-reports from MTurk workers indicate
that they are motivated by both intrinsic and extrinsic factors (Paolacci & Chandler,
2014). In addition, I am asking participants to engage in psychological processes that are
not exclusive to workplace settings.
In terms of future directions, as I previously discussed, researchers should
develop a more comprehensive model of the apology process, inclusive of additional
definitions of power and status. Scholars should test these hypotheses - both in terms of
the willingness to apologize and the reactions to an apology - in more naturalized
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settings. This may result in larger effect sizes. Nonetheless, because this is a relatively
new area of inquiry, it is important to conduct additional laboratory experiments first
before conducting field research. They key challenge in conducting research in the field
will be to determine a way to separate the effects of power and status using a nonexperimental methodology.
Apology researchers should take into account a range of power and status
differences between the offender and the victim. These differences might drive different
levels of instrumentality perceptions, a key psychological mechanism in the apology
process, as I discovered. Moreover, researchers should seek to uncover mechanisms
beyond instrumentality perceptions to help explain the relationship between status and
willingness to apologize. For example, researchers might consider remorse as a mediator
for status; I considered remorse as a mediator for power, but not for status. As I have
argued, high status orients individuals outward toward social entities. Thus, high status
individuals are expected to be more cognizant of the negative reactions of victims, and
ultimately should experience more remorse for their actions. Conversely, low status
individuals should be less concerned with the attitudes and feelings of others, and thus
less remorseful. This might help explain the relationship between low status and a
reduced willingness to apologize that I found.
In addition, a number of discrete emotions should be tested as mediators. I
suspect that emotions such as sadness and fear play a critical role in shaping status- and
power-holders’ willingness to apologize. This should be especially true is a real-world
context. Perhaps mechanisms other than instrumentality perceptions would be more
amenable to targeted interventions by organizations.
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Further, there are any number of moderating variables that might amplify the
effect of power and status on the apology process, including the personality of both the
offender and the victim. In addition, researchers should study actual apology behavior as
opposed to the willingness to apologize. With respect to the impact of apologies on
influence, researchers might study an actual demonstration of influence rather than
perceptions of warmth and dominance, factors that indirectly gauge influence.
Researchers should also study the impact of apologies from low power and low status
individuals.
Conclusion
Apologies are tools employed to resolve conflict and rectify offenses. The study
of apologies has garnered significant interest in both scholarly and popular outlets.
Scholars generally agree that apologies - particularly those in an interpersonal context are an effective means of repairing damaged relationships. Apologies would thus seem to
have an important role to play in organizational settings, notably within leadersubordinate dyads. Nonetheless, apologies have yet to be thoroughly examined in this
context, which is consistent with the notion that most apology studies consider apologies
without a consideration of power or status (Barling et al., 2008). My dissertation
addresses this research gap.
Power and status should play a role in the apology process (Tavuchis, 1991).
Indeed, scholars have argued that the powerful are hesitant to apologize (Brown &
Levinson, 1978; Lazare, 2004). However, empirical support for this contention is
inconclusive. Moreover, status has received scant attention relative to one’s willingness
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to apologize. What’s more, prior studies have conflated power and status, such that it is
unclear precisely how the individual factors influence the apology process.
In this dissertation, I demonstrate that power, as defined herein, does not have a
significant effect on one’s willingness to apologize. By contrast, I demonstrate that status
does have a significant effect on one’s willingness to apologize. More specifically, I find
that low status makes one less willing to apologize. Further, I find that instrumentality
perceptions mediate the relationship between status and willingness to apologize. These
findings have several important theoretical and practical implications relative to the
apology process, as well as to the power and status literatures.
In addition, I find that following an apology from either a high power or high
status individual, perceptions of the apologizer’s warmth improves, while perceptions of
the apologizer’s dominance are unchanged. These findings demonstrate that apologies
from those with high power and high status can play a key role in shaping one’s
impressions of these individuals following an interpersonal offense, which in turn has
positive implications for the influence process.
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Figure 1: Illustration of Willingness to Apologize depending on power or status
(Estimated marginal means) – Study 1.
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Figure 2: Illustration of perceived warmth of apologizer as a function of apology
delivered and power/status of apologizer (Estimated marginal means) – Study 2.
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Figure 3: Illustration of perceived dominance of apologizer as a function of apology
delivered and power/status of apologizer (Estimated marginal means)– Study 2.
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Figure 4: Diagram of the Mediation Model with Coefficients, Indirect Effect, and
Bootstrapped CIs – Study 3a.
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Figure 5: Diagram of the Mediation Model with Coefficients, Indirect Effect, and
Bootstrapped CIs – Study 3b.
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Table 1
Study 1: Estimated Marginal Means, Standard Errors, and n for Willingness to Apologize as a
Function of Power and Status
Power
High
Low
Control
Total

High Status
n EMM SE
6.06a
6.04
5.96
6.02e

49
45
48
142

0.21
0.22
0.22
0.13

n

Low Status
EMM

SE

52
37
54
143

5.34 b
5.54c
5.80
5.56f

0.21
0.25
0.20
0.13

Control Status
n EMM SE
5.95a
6.26d
5.73
5.98e

48
57
51
156

0.22
0.20
0.21
0.12

n

Total
EMM

SE

149
139
153
441

5.78
5.95
5.83
5.85

0.12
0.13
0.12
0.12

Notes: EMM = Estimated marginal means, adjusted for gender.
a, b
Estimated marginal means with these different superscripts differ, p < .05.
c, d
Estimated marginal means with these different superscripts differ, p < .05.
e, f
Estimated marginal means with these different superscripts differ, p < .05.
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Table 2
Study 2: Factor Loadings from Principal Axis Factor Analysis with Varimax Rotation
for a Two Factor Solution for Perception Questions (N=196)
Item

Warmth

Cooperative
Agreeable
Cordial
Respectful
Uncooperative
Quarrelsome

0.889
0.878
0.868
0.856
-0.744
-0.742

Disrespectful
Impolite
Assertive
Dominant
Forceful
Self-Assured
Submissive
Unassertive
Timid
Eigenvalues
% of variance

-0.702
-0.596

7.36
49.1

Dominance

0.804
0.763
0.646
0.621
-0.567
-0.526
-0.449
2.31
15.4

Note: Loadings < .40 are omitted.
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Table 3
Study 2: Estimated Marginal Means, Standard Errors, and n for Warmth as a Function of
Apology and Context
High Status
High Power
Total
EMM SE
EMM
EMM SE
n
n
SE
n
Apology
50
4.35a 0.22
46 4.25c
0.23
96
No Apology 50 2.60b 0.22
50 2.36d
0.22
100
Total
100 3.47
0.15
96 3.31
0.16
196
Notes: EMM = Estimated marginal means, adjusted for age.
a, b
Means with these different superscripts differ, p < .05.
c, d
Means with these different superscripts differ, p < .05.
e, f
Means with these different superscripts differ, p < .05.

4.30e
2.48f
3.39

0.16
0.15
0.16

Table 4
Study 2: Estimated Marginal Means, Standard Errors, and n for Dominance as a Function of
Apology and Context
High Status
EMM SE
n

High Power
EMM
n
SE

Apology
50
7.17 0.18
46
7.20
0.19
No Apology
50
7.40 0.18
50
7.65
0.18
Total
100 7.28 0.13
96
7.42
0.13
Note: EMM = Estimated marginal means, adjusted for age.

n

Total
EMM

SE

96
100
196

7.18
7.52
7.35

0.13
0.13
0.13

Table 5
Study 2: Univariate Effects of Apology and Context on Warmth and Dominance
Variable
df
MS
F
Age
Apology
Context
Apology x Context
Error

Dominance
Warmth
Dominance
Warmth
Dominance
Warmth
Dominance
Warmth
Dominance
Warmth

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
191
191

15.47
4.58
5.56
162.68
0.89
1.27
0.59
0.26
1.58
2.31

9.78
1.98
3.52
70.40
0.56
0.55
0.37
0.11

p

Partial η^2

0.002
0.161
0.062
0.000
0.454
0.460
0.542
0.737

0.05
0.01
0.02
0.27
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

102

Table 6
Study 3a: Estimated Marginal Means, Standard Errors, and n for Remorse as a Function
of Power
Power

n

EMM

SE

High
Low
Control
Total

49
45
54
148

4.13
4.25
3.90
4.08

.14
.15
.14
.14

Note: EMM = Estimated marginal means, adjusted for age.

Table 7
Study 3a: Estimated Marginal Means, Standard Errors, and n for Willingness to
Apologize as a Function of Power

Power

n

EMM

SE

High
Low
Control
Total

49
45
54
148

6.17
6.25
6.20
6.19

.17
.17
.17
.17

Note: EMM = Estimated marginal means, adjusted for age.
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Table 8
Study 3b: Means, Standard Deviations, and n for Instrumentality Perceptions as a
Function of Status
Status
High
Low
Control
Total

n

M

SD

53
46
49
148

3.46 a
2.96 b
3.29 a
3.25

0.77
0.72
0.67
0.75

Note: Means with different subscripts differ at p < .05.

Table 9
Study 3b: Estimated Marginal Means, Standard Errors, and n for Willingness to
Apologize as a Function of Status

Status
High
Low
Control
Total

n

EMM

SE

53
46
49
148

6.28 a
5.77 b
6.28 a
6.11

.15
.17
.16
.16

Notes: EMM = Estimated marginal means, adjusted for gender.
Estimated marginal means with different subscripts differ at p < .05.
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Appendix
Study 1 Materials
High Status Condition
You work at a pharmaceutical company and hold a great deal of status within this
organization. You have the sense that your colleagues really like, respect, and admire
you. Indeed, you possess a great deal of esteem within the organization. Note that this is
separate from the level of power that you possess in the organization.
Low Status Condition
You work at a pharmaceutical company and hold relatively little status within this
organization. You have do not have the sense that your colleagues particularly like,
respect, and admire you. Indeed, you possess little esteem within the organization. Note
that this is separate from the level of power that you possess in the organization.
High Power Condition
You work at a pharmaceutical company and hold a great deal of power within this
organization. Indeed you are one of the most powerful individuals in the company. You
are personally given control over an unusually large amount of resources, compared with
your peers in other departments. Note that this is separate from the amount of respect or
admiration that others in the organization feel toward you.
Low Power Condition
You work at a pharmaceutical company and hold relatively little power within this
organization. Indeed you are one of the least powerful individuals in the company. You
are personally given control over a relatively meager amount of resources, compared with
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your peers in other departments. Note that this is separate from the amount of respect or
admiration that others in the organization feel toward you.
Control Condition
You work at a pharmaceutical company.
High Power/High Status Condition
You work at a pharmaceutical company and hold a great deal of status within this
organization. You have the sense that your colleagues really like, respect, and admire
you. Indeed, you possess a great deal of esteem within the organization.
In addition, you hold a great deal of power within this organization. Indeed, you are one
of the most powerful individuals in the company. You are personally given control over
an unusually large amount of resources, compared with your peers in other departments.
Scenario
You are in a work meeting with a group of colleagues in which you are discussing the
product pipeline for the company. At one point in the meeting one of your colleagues
begins to ask a question that you find irrelevant. You interrupt the colleague and state
that the question that the colleague has asked is “stupid” in front of the rest of the group.
Post-Scenario Questions
How much power do you have at the company?
7-point Likert scale, anchored by 1 = "None at all" and 7 = "A great deal"
How much status do you have at the company?
7-point Likert scale, anchored by 1 = "None at all" and 7 = "A great deal"
How likely are you to apologize to your colleague about what happened during the
meeting?
7-point Likert scale, anchored by 1 = "Extremely unlikely" and 7 = "Extremely likely"
The following is the definition of apology: an explicit verbal or written statement of
apologetic intent such as ‘I am sorry’ that you believe is sincere.
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Study 2 Materials
Scenario
You work at a pharmaceutical company, and you are in a work meeting with a group of
colleagues. At one point in the meeting you begin to ask a question about the product
pipeline. At that point one of your colleagues interrupts you and states that the question
that you have posed is “stupid” in front of the rest of the group.
Status Condition
The person who interrupted you has a great deal of status in your organization and is
generally liked, respected, and admired by everyone in the organization.
Power Condition
The person who interrupted you has a great deal of power in your organization and
controls an unusually large amount of resources compared with others in the
organization.
Apology Condition
The following day the person who interrupted you apologized to you for the interruption
and for being rude. This person promised you that it would never happen again. You
believe that this person’s apology was sincere.
No apology condition - No information concerning an apology will be provided.
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Post-Scenario Questions
Please indicate the extent to which each of the following terms describes the person who
interrupted you. Use a 9-point scale to indicate your response, with 1 = Extremely
Inaccurate Description and 9 = Extremely Accurate Description.
1. cordial
2. respectful
3. cooperative
4. agreeable
5. impolite
6. disrespectful
7. uncooperative
8. quarrelsome
9. assertive
10. forceful
11. self-assured
12. dominant
13. submissive
14. unassertive
15. timid
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Study 3a Materials
High Power Condition
You work at a pharmaceutical company and hold a great deal of power within this
organization. Indeed you are one of the most powerful individuals in the company. You
are personally given control over an unusually large amount of resources, compared with
your peers in other departments. Note that this is separate from the amount of respect or
admiration that others in the organization feel toward you.
Low Power Condition
You work at a pharmaceutical company and hold relatively little power within this
organization. Indeed you are one of the least powerful individuals in the company. You
are personally given control over a relatively meager amount of resources, compared with
your peers in other departments. Note that this is separate from the amount of respect or
admiration that others in the organization feel toward you.
Control Condition
You work at a pharmaceutical company.
Scenario
You are in a work meeting with a group of colleagues in which you are discussing the
product pipeline for the company. At one point in the meeting one of your colleagues
begins to ask a question that you find irrelevant. You interrupt the colleague and state
that the question that the colleague has asked is “stupid” in front of the rest of the group.
Post-Scenario Questions
How much power do you have at the company?
7-point Likert scale, anchored by 1 = "None at all" and 7 = "A great deal."
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How much regret do you have about what happened during the meeting?
7-point Likert scale, anchored by 1 = "Very little" and 7 = "A great deal."
How much guilt or remorse do you have about what happened during the meeting?
7-point Likert scale, anchored by 1 = "Very little" and 7 = "A great deal."
How committed are you to not behaving in that way again?
7-point Likert scale, anchored by 1 = "Very little" and 7 = "A great deal."
How likely are you to apologize to your colleague about what happened during the
meeting?
7-point Likert scale, anchored by 1 = "Extremely unlikely" and 7 = "Extremely likely."
The following is the definition of apology: an explicit verbal or written statement of
apologetic intent such as ‘I am sorry’ that you believe is sincere.
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Study 3b Materials
High Status Condition
You work at a pharmaceutical company and hold a great deal of status within this
organization. You have the sense that your colleagues really like, respect, and admire
you. Indeed, you possess a great deal of esteem within the organization. Note that this is
separate from the level of power that you possess in the organization.
Low Status Condition
You work at a pharmaceutical company and hold relatively little status within this
organization. You have do not have the sense that your colleagues particularly like,
respect, and admire you. Indeed, you possess little esteem within the organization. Note
that this is separate from the level of power that you possess in the organization.
Control Condition
You work at a pharmaceutical company.
Scenario
You are in a work meeting with a group of colleagues in which you are discussing the
product pipeline for the company. At one point in the meeting one of your colleagues
begins to ask a question that you find irrelevant. You interrupt the colleague and state
that the question that the colleague has asked is “stupid” in front of the rest of the group.
Post-Scenario Questions
How much status do you have at the company?
7-point Likert scale, anchored by 1 = "None at all" and 7 = "A great deal."
To what extent do you think an apology is important for your colleague?
7-point Likert scale, anchored by 1 = "Not at all" and 7 = "Very much so"
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How effective do you think an apology will be to restore your relationship with your
colleague?
7-point Likert scale, anchored by 1 = "Not at all" and 7 = "Very much so"
To what extent do you think an apology will repair the damaged trust between you and
your colleague?
7-point Likert scale, anchored by 1 = "Not at all" and 7 = "Very much so"
How likely are you to apologize to your colleague about what happened during the
meeting?
7-point Likert scale, anchored by 1 = "Extremely unlikely" and 7 = "Extremely likely."
The following is the definition of apology: an explicit verbal or written statement of
apologetic intent such as ‘I am sorry’ that you believe is sincere.
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